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INTRODUCTION
When the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
released its quadrennial report on International Humanitarian Law
(IHL) in 2019, it highlighted the seventieth anniversary of the 1949
Geneva Conventions.1 This report seeks to redefine the methods of
hostilities during urban warfare, restricting the use of explosive
weapons with a wide-impact area, and eliminating sieges.2 The
ICRC has been instrumental in developing IHL. Perhaps the ICRC’s
most well-recognized achievements are the 1949 Geneva
Conventions to protect combatants and non-combatants: the
wounded and sick armed forces in the field, at sea, as prisoners of
war, and civilians under enemy control.3 Although the 1949 Geneva
Conventions emerged as a reactionary measure to the horrors and
atrocities that occurred during the Second World War,4 the ICRC
feels that modern warfare—especially as it related to the growth of
asymmetric warfare5—is not adequately covered by the 1949
Geneva Conventions, spurring new Conventions, such as
Additional Protocols (AP) I and II.6
AP I and II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions demonstrate the
adaptability of international humanitarian law. The Geneva
Conventions of 1949 were created to limit the actions taken by
belligerent States7 during war for soldiers on land, at sea, in prison,
1. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS: RECOMMITTING TO PROTECTION IN
ARMED CONFLICT ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 10 (Nov. 22,
2019) [hereinafter IHL REPORT].
2. See id. at 16–34.
3. History of the ICRC, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2016),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/history-icrc.
4. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions: Even Wars Have Limits, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS (June 11, 2019), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-evenwars-have-limits.
5. Asymmetric warfare is characterized by significant disparities between the
military capacities of the belligerent parties, particularly in reference to weaponry. See INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflicts, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 719, 732 n.7 (2007), https://www.icrc.org/
en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-867-ihl-challenges.pdf.
6. See History of the ICRC, supra note 3. For other conventions, see Treaties, States
Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByTopics.xsp (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
7. In international law and international humanitarian law, countries and city-states
are referred to as “States” to distinguish themselves from smaller sub-divisions within a
country itself, such as states, provinces, municipalities, divisions, cantons, etc.
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and, for the first time ever, civilians.8 In attempting to reach a
large-enough consensus by members of a then-infant United
Nations (U.N.), negotiations become heated, and concessions were
made to only covering international armed conflicts (thereby
omitting protections of combatants in a civil war).9 For example, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not define perfidy or who qualifies
as a civilian, nor did it address military aviation and attacks or
protections for medical personnel. Thus, a controversial aerial
attack, like the fire-bombing of Dresden,10 could be considered legal
under those circumstances. In the following decades, military
conflicts (such as those in Korea, Hungary, and Vietnam)
demonstrated other, numerous limitations of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. Thus, the ICRC sought to cover the gaps in the law
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions failed to address, including
incorporating protections for civilians and medical personnel,
limiting perfidy (such as spy-warfare), and regulating military
aviation through AP I and II.11
Notwithstanding the 1949 Geneva Conventions and AP I and
II, the ICRC published four reports on IHL in the last two decades.
Three of those reports have touched on the dangers and effects
of urban armed conflict, but only in reference to other challenges,
such as protection of medical personnel, urban warfare12 in
8. International humanitarian law is a complex subject, and it might not be
considered really “adaptable.” Trying to reach consensus among dozens of countries, with
differing goals and cultural perspectives, is a daunting task. Historically, the Hague and
Geneva Conventions were instituted by world powers at the time. As a rule of thumb, the
Hague Conventions were agreed upon during the nineteenth century, generally written by
military leaders and officials, who were trying to make warfare cheaper, easier, and more
effective. Whereas the Geneva Conventions are considered to be more about the moral
obligations to human beings, culture, and property. Richard L. Fruchterman, Jr., Enforcement:
The Difference Between the Laws of War and the Geneva Conventions, 13 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
303, 304 (1983); see also 150 Years of Humanitarian Action: The Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNASpaceKSg.
9. See David A. Elder, The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention of 1949, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 37, 53 (1979).
10. Toby Luckhurst, Dresden: The World War Two Bombing 75 Tears On, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51448486.
11. See, e.g., Drafting History of the 1977 Additional Protocols, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/cross-files/drafting-history-1977-additionalprotocols/. Since 1977, there have been several dozen treaties pushed for by the ICRC to
adapt to the ever-changing methods and types of warfare. See generally Treaties, State Parties
and Commentaries: By Date, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.xsp (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
12. The terms warfare and armed conflict will be used synonymously in this Note.
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non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and asymmetric armed
conflict.13 By prioritizing contemporary challenges to IHL in its
2019 report, the ICRC emphasizes the controversies surrounding
armed conflicts in cities including explosive weapons in populated
areas, the effects on services in urban areas, widespread
displacement, sieges, and potentially dangerous aftereffects such as
unexploded ordnance or weapon contamination.14 Although the
ICRC discusses the potential ramifications surrounding armed
conflicts in cities, it does so abstractly. For example, the ICRC cites
the possible IHL problems that could occur when one State uses
explosive weapons in populated areas. It mentions only two
examples of state practice, both in the same footnote concerning
convictions of military leaders in the International Criminal
Tribunal of Yugoslavia for forcibly deporting its citizens as a
violation of IHL.15
The ICRC implicitly mentions AP I16 in the 2019 report,17 in
regards to phrases legally defined in AP I: “proportionality” and
the “feasible precautions.”18 Furthermore, the ICRC, similar
non-governmental agencies (NGOs), and 174 States accept AP I as
13. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 30–33,
47–53
(2015),
https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic-report-on-ihl-and-challenges-of-armedconflicts.pdf; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 40–42 (2011), https://e-brief.icrc.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/08/4-international-humanitarian-law-and-the-challenges-ofcontemporary-armed-conflicts.pdf; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 5, at 733–34
(discussing briefly urban warfare). The first report, the twenty-eighth conference, did not
choose to discuss anything relating to the dangers of urban warfare. See INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICTS (2003), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/ihlcontemp_
armedconflicts_final_ang.pdf.
14. IHL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16–25.
15. See id. at 24 n.16. See generally id. at 16–25.
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (applying as treaty law to international armed conflicts (IACs)).
17. Cf. Geoffrey Corn & James A. Schoettler, Jr., Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation:
The Essential Role of Precautionary Measures, 223 MIL. L. REV. 785, 789, 809–10 (2015) (applying
proportionality and feasible precautions in a different way). The way the ICRC utilizes and
applies these terms might lead novices in international humanitarian law to perceive that no
customary law is needed and that the AP I definitions are the most correct.
18. Compare AP I, supra note 16, at arts. 57, 78 (stating the basic standards of
proportionality and feasible precautions), with IHL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 19–20, 23–24
(employing proportionality and feasible precautions as legal terms of art).
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treaty law.19 Since the ICRC took the initiative in creating the 1949
Geneva Conventions and subsequent Protocols, their opinion of
IHL is incredibly strong and valuable for other States when
considering actions they want to take. Thus, although the ICRC
claims that urban armed conflict is not illegal by public
international law or IHL standards, the ICRC implies that States
make illegal decisions during urbanized armed conflict.20 Yet the
ICRC’s interpretation of IHL neglects military necessity and
customary international law (custom). By undervaluing military
necessity and custom, they inevitably undermine the foundational
principles of the law of armed conflict.21
Since armed conflict in an urban setting engages the principles
of humanity, distinction, and proportionality, nevertheless both the
attacking and defending States require military necessity and
custom to respond to each other. Failure to allow for military
necessity and custom opens the floodgates in actionable offenses,
preventing military leaders and State officials from acting, resulting
in further violations of the law of armed conflict and undermining
humanitarian principles.
This Note will focus on responding to the quadrennial report in
three parts. Part I will discuss the legal principles of proportionality
and distinction of urban international armed conflicts (IACs)
through application of AP I article 57. Part II will consider how
defending States should have a larger role in protecting civilians
during an urban armed conflict under a firmer reading of AP I

19. As of this writing there are some notable exceptions, including, but not limited to,
the United States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Turkey. Treaties, State Parties and
Commentaries: Additional Protocol I, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelect
ed=470 (last visited Sept. 24, 2021). One other state, Russia, withdrew on October 23, 2019.
Id. For more information as to why the United States decided not to ratify AP I concerning
articles 48–58, see Abraham D. Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions on the Protections of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 786 (1988) (arguing
that most of the problems come from the application of IHL to civilians); Michael J.
Matheson, Remarks in Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 419 (1987).
20. See IHL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18–19.
21. The law of armed conflict and IHL are considered by many to be one and the same;
IHL will be used in this essay more in conjunction with the ICRC, whereas the law of armed
conflict will be used elsewhere.
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article 58. And Part III will discuss potential future problems of
armed conflict in urban areas.
I. AP I AND URBAN ARMED CONFLICT
When discussing the general principles of armed conflict and
the legality of a decision in the law of armed conflict, there are
several generally recognized principles to take into account:
military necessity, proportionality, humanity,22 and distinction.23
Chapter IV of AP I, which applies solely to IACs, includes a fifth
customary general principle: precautions.24 AP I articles 5725 and

22. The principle of humanity is one of the oldest principles within the law of armed
conflict, being declared officially in the Martens Clause, within the Preamble of the 1899
Hague Convention. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague)
pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
23. Many States decide what they consider “general principles” of armed conflict. For
example, the U.K. military manual lists necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction
as general principles of armed conflict, U.K. MINISTRY DEF., THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 2.1 (2004); but the U.S. Law of War manual adds a new
principle: honor, see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶
2.1.2.3 [hereinafter DOD LOWM]; and the Canadian Forces’ Joint includes chivalry, the
principle of the Law of Geneva, the Law of the Hague, non-discrimination, and reciprocity
as general principles of armed conflict, see CAN. DEP’T OF NAT’L DEF., JOINT DOCTRINE
MANUAL B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND
TACTICAL LEVELS (2001), ¶¶ 202–04. This essay will focus on those specified by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 41, 78 (July 8).
24. AP I, supra note 16, at arts. 57–58. It may be considered part of custom, but not all
military manuals expressly adopt it as a principle; see discussion supra note 23. Precautions
may be circumscribed into other principles, mostly humanity, but precautions may be
differentiated because they are a mixture of humanity and proportionality.
25. Article 57 of AP I states:
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are
not subject to special protection but are military
objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them;
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any
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5826 are recognized by the ICRC as the codification of custom,27
but other States do not regard them as binding parts of custom.28
This Part will analyze urban armed conflict through the lenses of
AP I articles 57 and 58,29 because even the ICRC commentators
perceive that “[i]t is clear that the precautions [articles 57 and 58]
prescribed here will be of greatest importance in urban areas
event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent
that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special
protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a
similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack
on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to
civilian objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the
conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions
to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.
5. No provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks
against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
Id. at art. 57.
26. Article 58 of AP I states:
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:
(a) Without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects
under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) Avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas;
(c) Take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the
dangers resulting from military operations.
Id. at art. 58.
27. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–5 (2009).
28. See discussion supra note 23.
29. From here on out, any articles referred herein will refer only to AP I, unless
otherwise noted.
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because such areas are most densely populated.”30 Furthermore,
this essay will examine articles 57 and 58, through their usefulness
in defining proportionality and distinction, as counterweights to
military necessity.31
A. Differentiation of Articles 57 and 58
Before discussing the principles of the law of urban armed
conflict, however, several points of contention arise concerning
articles 57 and 58. Article 57 focuses on the responsibilities of the
attacking State, whereas article 58 emphasizes the duties of the
defending State. As such, the ICRC distinguishes the two
articles by calling article 57, “active precautions” and article 58,
“‘passive’ precautions.”32 This designation implies that the
defending State would not or does not have any obligation to be
more proactive, by creating escape plans and anti-besiegement
tactics, or protecting civilians or civilian objects by limiting their
relative distance to a potential military objective. The ICRC
commentary clarifies that article 58 concerns measures that every
State must take in its own territory,33 but it does not dispel notions
that the defending State should take any “active” role in protecting
its own citizens, focusing instead on reactionary measures a
defending State could take.34
The AP I travaux preparatoires explain that the reason why both
articles were included in the same chapter is because “in practice,
they were interdependent.”35 Compared to the role of the attacking
30. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 679 n.2190 (YVES Sandoz,
Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY AP I].
31. See id. at 678 n.2185. There will also be no differentiation made in this essay
between towns and cities with other types of bombardments on land.
32. See id. at 692 n.2241.
33. See id. at 692 n.2240.
34. See id.
35. 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 181 ¶ 3 (Federal Political Department 1978) [hereinafter O.R. XIV],
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-14.pdf; see also Draft
Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 15, 1956), http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/420?
OpenDocument (explaining that the Draft Rules are a continuation of efforts taken into
consideration with other treaties); Eric T. Jensen, Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks in
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State, however, there is little debate or discussion concerning
the role of the defending State,36 since several States desire the
freedom to organize their national defense in their own, most
effective way.37 To some extent, some have argued that article
57 overshadows article 58 to the point that the defending State
should not even have duties.38 Comparatively, other academics
argue that there should be no difference between the attacking State
and defending State in attacking or preparing for an attack.39 It
is the purpose of this essay to show that not only do defending
States have the duty to prepare for an impending attack, but it
would serve both the purposes of humanitarian and military
necessity principles.

Urban Areas, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 147, 155 (2016) (It is clear that at its inception, Article
58 was designed to be read in conjunction with the corresponding protections for civilians
found in Article 57). It should also be explained that when reading the official records, the
Committee actually had articles 57 and 58 named articles 50 and 51 respectively.
36. Only one and a half pages. See O.R. XIV, supra note 35, at 198–99, ¶¶ 7–15. Compare
this to the extensive discussion given to article 57, fifteen pages, in one separate meeting
(with dozens of other mentions elsewhere) in these meetings. See id. at 181–95; see also id. at
51–58 (discussing, in connection with article 51, the ways in which both interact and the legal
responsibilities that should be relegated to article 51 versus article 57).
37. See O.R. XIV, supra note 35 at 121, ¶ 21, at 156 ¶ 27, at 159 ¶ 45 (showing
that the Soviet Union, Belgium, and Yugoslavia vied for maintaining their own
defensive schemes); see also 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON
THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 222–23, 229–30 (Federal Political Department 1978)
[hereinafter O.R. VI], https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-6.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170210175503/https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_L
aw/pdf/RC-records_Vol-6.pdf] (showing that Australia and Indonesia had reservations
about article 58 hoping that there would be no effect on their civil defense structures).
38. See John F. Murphy, Some Legal (and a Few Ethical) Dimensions of the Collateral
Damage Resulting from NATO’s Kosovo Campaign, 31 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 51, 60–61 (2001)
(reading W. Hays Parks’ analysis that the interpretation of AP I would lead States to believe
that the attacking State has all the responsibility, and the defending State has none).
39. A defending State’s duties could be considered manifold. See W. Hays Parks, Air
War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 153–54 (1990) (explaining that the duties of defenders
to protect the civilian population has been turned on its head via AP I); see also Samuel
Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties Under International
Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 431–435 (2011); Jean-François Quéguiner,
Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793,
820–21 (2006) (concluding that although there is a sharing of responsibility, there is however
no implication that neither of the attacker or defender’s obligations are freed by relying on
the other’s commitment to IHL). It is interesting to note that the more experience a legal
scholar has had in armed conflict, the more they are willing to recognize a defending State’s
duties during armed conflict.
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Yet at least one State did not agree to changes to the language
of article 58, hoping that the list would not be considered the limit
of the defending State. For instance, when agreeing to the language
of article 58, Israel stated that “the list set out in Article 58 . . . is not
exhaustive, and that there are other acts which are not considered
as ‘acts harmful to the enemy’ beyond the illustrative list set out in
the article.”40 This interpretation shows that some States41 expect
the defending State to not remain passive, but to act in some degree
to protect its civilian population, and that defending States should
be allowed to exercise its defenses in such a way to protect itself.
Coupled with the Lotus principle,42 which says that everything that
is not specifically prohibited is allowed,43 this could allow
defending States to create military strategies based on urban
layouts, layer and increase security around its urban areas, build
walls, and exercise potential privacy incursions if it would protect
its population.44
Conversely, a defending State could view the lack of regulation
under article 57 as placing the greater burden on attacking States.
Comparatively, article 57 has about four times the number of duties
than article 58. This line of thinking, that AP I is exhaustive law and
not exemplary, might also lead an attacking State to perceive that if
not specifically prohibited in AP I and under the Lotus principle,
therefore custom does not apply. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
during the drafting of AP I, agents of the various States wanted to
limit military necessity by restating customary humanitarian
principles that States should exercise.45
Comparing article 57(5), meant to limit a potential attacking
State’s interpretation of the Lotus principle, to article 58(c), shows

40. O.R. VI, supra note 37, at 230. This may be confusing as there is only one paragraph
listing three points. However, it might be because both Israel and the ICRC consider each
bullet point as a separate section. See generally COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 692–95.
41. Which would also include the former U.S.S.R. See O.R. VI, supra note 35, at 237–38.
42. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 63 (Sept. 7)
(Nyholm M., dissenting).
43. See COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 689 n.2238 (“The law relating to the
conduct of hostilities is primarily a law of prohibition: it does not authorize, but prohibits
certain things.”).
44. See, e.g., Jack Anderson, The Wall Is the Wall: Why Fortresses Fail, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/wall-wall-fortresses-fail/.
45. See O.R. XIV, supra note 35, at 197–98 ¶¶2–5 (demonstrating that the U.S. and the
Finnish delegates both reiterated humanitarian principles in the ways they perceived them).
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that the drafters most likely wanted to shift the burden of
responsibility from the defending State to the attacking State.
Article 57(5) limits an attacking State to look for methods of warfare
that would avoid collateral damage or civilians and civilian objects.
Whereas article 58(c) meant to allow for defending States to exercise
the Lotus principle to “the maximum extent feasible.”46 Originally
article 58(c) did not even use the term “take all other necessary
precautions,”47 wherein the drafters would thereby dictate to a
defending State its obligations.48 This shows that from an originalist
and intentionalist perspective, defending States would have no
obligations. But by adding a “necessary precautions” clause,
defending States would have to use precautionary principles in
protecting its civilians and civilian objects.
B. Proportionality
Proportionality qualifies any belligerent deliberately attacking
a lawful target to not “be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.”49 Proportionality was
meant to be codified from custom in article 51(5)(b) and elaborated
on in article 57.50 Incidental deaths and injuries to civilians and
incidental damages to civilians’ property have been allowed under
the law of armed conflict for the last half century.51 Nevertheless,
the belligerent is required to make an assessment of the exposure
to and the level of injury or damage that may result from an attack
by weighing that against the possible military advantage gained
from that attack;52 this decision is granted to the belligerent’s
military commander.53

46. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 58.
47. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 58(c).
48. See O.R. XIV, supra note 35, at 198 ¶ 8. The Romanian agent to AP I wanted to
change the language to include the word all, thereby forcing defending States to have a
higher duty, but this was passed without any comments by the Working Group eventually,
see id. at 304, ¶ 33; O.R. VI, supra note 37, at 213–15; see also discussion supra note 37.
49. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 27, at 46.
50. See id.; see also id. at 47 n.8 (referencing twenty-six different military manuals that
reference the principle of proportionality).
51. Sahr Muhammedally, Minimizing Civilian Harm in Populated Areas: Lessons from
Examining ISAF and AMISOM Policies, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 225, 228 (2016).
52. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 797–803.
53. See id. at 797–98.
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1. Constant care standard: article 57(1)
Article 57(1) states that belligerents must exercise “constant
care” to “spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects.”54 In creating this standard, AP I broadens the rules and
policies belligerents may employ by including all military
operations not necessarily included in the subsequent
paragraphs.55 For example, when creating targeting rules, a United
States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction on targeting
and proportionality stated, “care must be exercised in the methods
used to derive No-Strike entity locations.”56 Under urban armed
conflict, constant care would imply that in all parts of an armed
conflict—the preparation, targeting, attacking, and subsequent
occupation of the targeted State—the belligerent should attempt to
protect civilians. In an era with precision-guided missiles (PGMs),
drone warfare, and artificial intelligence, belligerents should take
more precautions in caring for civilians.57 Nevertheless, these types
of precautions only apply under article 57 to attacking States,
implying that defending States have no legal responsibility to “take
care” of their civilian populations.58 Defending States most likely
have political, legal, and moral obligations to take care of their
civilian populations, especially if their leaders want to avoid being
democratically voted out, facing civil unrest, or incurring
international sanctions.59 Nonetheless, State leaders know that they
54. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 57 ¶ 1.
55. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 797 (explaining that the belligerents’ obligation is
to use some level of care).
56. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSI 3160.01, NO-STRIKE AND THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY C-A-2 (Feb. 13, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/field_document/drone_dod_3160_01.pdf.
57. Cf. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 17, at 787, 826–37.
58. See, e.g., 35 Killed in Kabul Suicide Bomb Attack, CHINA DAILY (June 18, 2007),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/18/content_896390.htm (describing a
Taliban suicide attack in 2002 that originally was meant to attack United States and coalition
forces but actually killed dozens of civilians and wounded 167 people instead). Although
this could be considered a NIAC, or was considered a NIAC by the United States in early
2002, it could also be considered an IAC. See The Nature and Scope of the War in Afghanistan,
OPINIO JURIS (May 28, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/05/28/the-nature-and-scope-ofthe-war-in-afghanistan/. Thus, suicide bombers authorized by a defending State would
be legal.
59. State leaders generally want to avoid civil unrest more than anything else, from
Julius Caesar to the French Revolution to the Guinean coup. See, e.g., Guinea Coup Leader to
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have sovereign immunity,60 and there are numerous accounts of
leaders either not “taking care” of their populations or purposefully
attacking their civilians during international and non-international
armed conflicts, even within the last five years.61
In developing the constant care standard, it is important to
differentiate it from precautions, which are much more rigidly
defined. Constant care standards are more ambiguously defined
through custom. Legal scholar Jean-François Quéguiner describes
this duty as “relatively abstract.”62 Conversely, precautions are
more strictly defined as a subset of constant care.63 Furthermore,
although the language of constant care is employed in article 57, it
has been applied to defending States through military operations,64
whereas precautions are only applied in attack.

Form New Government in Weeks, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-58461436.
60. State leaders generally have sovereign immunity. Omar al-Bashir might be the first
State leader to be charged, arrested, and prosecuted in an international court for war crimes
committed while acting as a State leader. His prosecution is novel and will probably set the
standard for potential future prosecutions of State leaders and might result in possible
backlash against the International Criminal Court from other leaders. See Omar Bashir: ICC
Delegation Begins Talks in Sudan over Former Leader, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-africa-54548629.
61. In particular, for international armed conflicts where a country was unwilling or
unable to protect its own population, such as when Turkey invaded Iraq to attack Kurds
living in Iraq during Operation Claw, the Iraqis let the Turkish forces attack Kurdish refugees
without a proportional response. See Namo Abdulla & Ezel Sahinkaya, Turkish Operation
Increases Conflict Among Kurds in Iraq, VOA NEWS (June 21, 2021, 6:16 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/turkish-operation-increases-conflictamong-kurds-iraq. Non-international armed conflicts where a country purposefully
attacked its own population include but are not limited to Sudan committing war crimes in
Darfur, Syria, launching at least 336 chemical attacks on its own population; Venezuela using
colectivos to attack and torture dissidents; and at least fifteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa
potentially committing war crimes against their own people. See Reha Kansara, Sudan’s
Darfur Conflict’s Latest Surge in Violence Displaces Thousands, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57899843; Clare Lombardo, More than 300
Chemical Attacks Launched During Syrian Civil War, Study Says, NPR (Feb. 17, 2019, 12:14 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/17/695545252/more-than-300-chemical-attacks-launchedduring-syrian-civil-war-study-says; Crackdown on Dissent: Brutality, Torture, and Political
Persecution in Venezuela, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2017/11/30/crackdown-dissent/brutality-torture-and-political-persecution-venezuela; and
Ian Davis, Armed Conflict and Peace Processes in Sub-Saharan Africa, SIPRI Y.B. 2020,
https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/07 (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
62. Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 796.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 802–03; see COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 680 n.2191.
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The constant care standard thus may not necessarily always be
upheld since there is no law requiring precision weaponry.65
Moreover, in observing the United States’ and other States’
methodology to prevent further harm and other customary
practices, attacking States are highly unlikely to want to completely
destroy a whole city.66 Rather, cautions of constant care should be
interpreted as allowing some measure of collateral damage. For
instance, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
response to Moammar Qadhafi’s actions during the Arab Spring in
Libya, NATO took substantial precautions, effectively constant care
types of actions, such as using PGMs exclusively, using delayed
fusing to minimize collateral effects, using minimum-sized
munitions, not targeting if there were any reason to believe civilians
would be injured or killed, and issuing leaflets and radio broadcasts
to warn the civilian population.67 Even though the NATO response
almost exemplifies the “constant care” standard, sixty civilians
were killed and another fifty-five were injured.68 The “constant
care” standard, possibly because it has no legal definition, is rarely
discussed or included in litigation proceedings.69 In the NATO
example, the United Nations and an NGO (Human Rights Watch)
both recognized the applicable law, but neither mentioned
anything resembling constant care, opting to instead discuss
proportionality and feasible precautions.70 Yet, as international
law develops further, a legal definition of constant care may emerge
and be applied in the future, considering the extensive discussion
afforded it in the Goldstone Report on the Israeli-Palestinian
armed conflict.71
65. See discussion infra Section I.B.2.a.
66. Gone are the days of salting down a city. See discussion infra Section I.B.3.c.
67. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, ¶¶
84–89, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (2012) [hereinafter Human Rights Council]; see also
Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (May 14, 2012) [hereinafter Unacknowledged Deaths], https://www.hrw.org/report/
2012/05/13/unacknowledged-deaths/civilian-casualties-natos-air-campaign-libya.
68. See Human Rights Council, supra note 67, at ¶ 86. But see Unacknowledged Deaths,
supra note 67 (saying at least seventy-two civilians were killed).
69. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 796.
70. See generally Human Rights Council, supra note 67; Unacknowledged Deaths, supra
note 67.
71. Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and
Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 279, 295–300 (2010). The Goldstone Report complicates
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Article 57(2) elucidates the different types of precautions an
attacking State must take during an armed conflict. Article 57(2)(a)(i)
is discussed more fully in section I.C below.
2. Means and methods of attack: article 57(2)(a)(ii)
Article 57(2)(a)(ii) explains that the attacking State should take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack in avoiding and minimizing loss to civilian life, injury, and
damage to civilians and civilian objects. The ICRC believes that this
section72 deals mostly with the employment of weapons, including
pre-assessed weapons,73 to determine the legality of their use. Yet,
there is no prohibition of specific weapons, nor do those same
weapons have to be pre-approved by other States other than the
High Contracting Party.74 There are weapons that might be illegal
per se, such as poisoned weapons75 or weapons that cannot be
directed at a specific military objective.76 States must also be aware
of any treaty prohibitions or limitations, such as biological and

the interpretation by stating “the launching of attacks from or in the vicinity of civilian
buildings and protected areas are serious violations of the obligation on the armed groups
to take constant care to protect civilians from the inherent dangers created by military
operations.” Hum. Rts. Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories:
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 497, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf. This, as Blank states, implies that constant care actually
invokes article 58 standards of feasible precautions by the defending State since the
defending State will most likely counterattack or hide among civilians in an urban
environment, making it difficult for the attacking State to respond to those counterattacks.
72. The ICRC also believes that it is meant to buttress article 35. See COMMENTARY AP
I, supra note 30, at 398 n.1402, 403–04 n.1418.
73. See AP I, supra note 16, at arts. 35–36; see also COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at
682 n.2200.
74. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 682 n.2201.
75. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague) art. 23, Oct. 18,
1907, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [hereinafter Hague IV], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=61CDD9E446504870C
12563CD00516768 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
76. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 51(4)(b).
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chemical warfare,77 nuclear weapons,78 and exploding or
expanding bullets.79 Other weapons are governed by treaty but
have slowly been phased out by large powers by abiding by
customary practices, such as landmines, booby traps, incendiary
weapons, and blinding laser weapons.80 Thus, as technology in
armed conflict increases and adapts, each State must employ its
own judgment and examine its legal treaty obligations to determine
what types of weapons it may use.81
The ICRC comments that this subsection declares that there
should be no excessive use of weapons, making particular note of
the precautionary measures taken by the Allies in World War II in
bombing arms factories located in territories occupied by German
77. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45;
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
78. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
79. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/full/declaration1868 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); Hague IV, supra note
75, at art. 23.
80. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
81. Technology is always adapting and changing. Part III, below, discusses the types
of changes that are already foreseeable, such as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, space
arms, drones, and chemical and biological warfare. As a result, there are also no legal
ramifications on a State to try to stop innovation or prohibit the use of new technologies.
Some advances may be used for warfare. For example, prior to World War II, rocket
technologies and nuclear fission (the precursor to nuclear bombs) were technologies meant
for other endeavors, such as space travel and providing cleaner energy. Nevertheless, the
demands of war changed the original objectives. As Wernher von Braun allegedly remarked
about his rockets attacking London, “[T]he rockets worked perfectly except for landing on
the wrong planet.” John Noble Wilford, Wernher von Braun, Rocket Pioneer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18, 1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/18/archives/wernher-von-braunrocket-pioneer-dies-wernher-von-braun-pioneer-in.html. As a result, the ICRC and other
nongovernmental organizations have worked to create multilateral treaties. For example,
following World War II, the threat of nuclear warfare spurred many nuclear proliferation
treaties, twenty-nine as of 2021. Treaties and Regimes, NTI, https://www.nti.org/
learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). Likewise, there are currently
attempts at limiting cyberwarfare, such as the Tallinn Manual, and artificial intelligence,
such as the Committee Ad Hoc on Artificial Intelligence. See generally TALLINN MANUAL ON
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013);
CAHAI – Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/
en/web/artificial-intelligence/cahai (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
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troops.82 This interpretation falls in line with proportionality. Other
examples of awareness of the means and methods of attack include
U.S. forces minimizing civilian losses by conducting attacks at night
when the population had left the streets,83 the United States
Department of Defense abandoning an amphibious attack during
the First Persian Gulf War would have been too “costly,”84 and the
strike packages the United States Air Force (USAF) took in
minimizing casualties and damage to civilian objects during
Operation Desert Storm.85 The fact that the United States recognizes
article 57(2)(a)(ii) as custom, while denying other portions of article
57, via state practice denotes the strength of this section in the
principle of proportionality.
Nevertheless, the means and methods of attack are complicated
by modern urbanized conflicts and an imbalance of the opposing
armed forces’ military capabilities.86 Scholars define military
asymmetry (asymmetry) as the imbalance in military strength,
skills, tactics, methods, and knowledge between two groups. Thus,
many civil wars or internal armed conflicts are usually
asymmetrical until one group gains legitimacy or help from other
States. Because of asymmetry, it has been argued that attacking
82. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 682 n.2200 (“When a well-placed 500 kg
projectile is sufficient to render a military objective useless, there is no reason to use a 10 ton
bomb or a series of projectiles aimed without sufficient precision.”).
83. Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Dec. 11, 2003), https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target/conduct-war-andcivilian-casualties-iraq.
84. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 244 (1992) [hereinafter
DOD PGW], https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a249270.pdf. Although the U.S.
military does not recognize AP I as a whole, it does recognize portions of article 57 as
customary international law. See id.
85. John G. Humphries, Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, 6 AIRPOWER J. 25, 36–37 (1992), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-06_Issue-1-4/1992_Vol6_No3.pdf.
86. Michael John-Hopkins, Regulating the Conduct of Urban Warfare: Lessons from
Contemporary Asymmetric Armed Conflicts, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 469, 470 (2010). This is the
argument that some scholars use to not employ precision-military equipment. See
Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 802–03. Ultimately, this seems to tie in with why the ICRC wants
the attacking State to be limited in its actions because defending States appear to be
defending themselves and their civilian populations. When a “bigger, badder” bully comes
in to destabilize a regime or government, the attacking State becomes an aggressor.
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily always work in practice, especially when forces are
sent into an area to protect the civilians from their own government, such as the Rwandan
genocide or potential escalation of Haitian or Panamanian leaders into dictators. See
discussion infra Section I.B.3.e.
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States might be much quicker in capturing, destroying, and
neutralizing military objectives than the defending State might be
in setting up strategic defenses because the attacking State
instigated the attack.87 Thus, with a quick and rapid invasion by an
attacking State, defending States may be caught unawares, leading
to potential guerrilla-style fighting or resistance efforts, such as
those undertaken by France during World War II. Those same
commentators argue that defending States may turn to guerrilla
warfare, leading to deliberate and systematic harm of noncombatants such as bombing civilian infrastructure, torture, rape,
and murder.88 This argument is overly dramatic: the French
Resistance under the Vichy government did not devolve into this
dystopian-style society. Undergirding this argument are several
rebuttable premises: that military personnel are war hawks, that
powerful attacking States are quick, and that attacking States will
initially attack areas of high population density, which leads the
defending State to counterattack by moving away from urban areas
pursuant to guerrilla warfare.89
Military officials believe that armed conflict in urban settings
might work better if performed by military officials who know the
law of armed conflict, are supervised by judge advocates, and are
given the liberty to engage in a war to the fullest extent permitted

87. It almost seems like the ICRC and its advocates perceive military personnel to be
war-like psychopaths. See generally John-Hopkins, supra note 86 (using denigrating language
against military officials); IVAN ARREGUIN-TOFT, HOW THE WEAK WIN WARS: A THEORY OF
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT (2005). Yet, while many military men view it from Carl von
Clausewitz’s perspective that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means,” CARL
VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 23 (J.J. Graham trans., 3d ed. 1918), many other military
commanders perceive some measure of armed conflict as a means of maintaining peace. See,
e.g., Peter van Uhm, Why I Chose a Gun, TED, https://www.ted.com/talks/
peter_van_uhm_why_i_chose_a_gun/up-next?language=en (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); Tom
Shales, Stormin’ Norman in High Command, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 1991),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1991/02/28/stormin-norman-inhigh-command/cd526793-85a6-4332-9ad9-61dc1d164b5f/ (“The loss of one human life is
intolerable to any of us who are in the military[.]”).
88. ARREGUIN-TOFT, supra note 87, at 4, 31–34, 43, 204–05 (arguing this type of
imbalance occurred in Vietnam, Chechnya, Gaza, the West Bank, Afghanistan, and Iraq).
89. See, e.g., Marc W. Herold, The Spatial Distribution of Afghan Civilian Casualties Caused
by the U.S. Air War, October 7 – December 6th, Appendix 5 to A Dossier on Civilian Victims of the
United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting, CURSOR (Dec. 2001),
http://cursor.org/stories/appendix5.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20020127041733/
http://cursor.org/stories/appendix5.htm].
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to them.90 Concerning the autonomy given to the military
establishment during the First Gulf War, retired Admiral U.S.
Grant Sharp, who was in charge of the Pacific Command during the
Vietnam War, stated, “If I had had the same sort of freedom that
[the commander of United States Central Command] has, the
Vietnam War would have been over in about 1966. We would have
defeated North Vietnam, saved hundreds of American lives and
won the war.”91
Military leaders and officials have the benefit of the doubt in
exercising reasonableness, per article 57(3).92 Part of that
reasonableness allows for military leaders, who are educated in the
law of armed conflict, to make decisions under fire (often in a
literal sense) with resources and knowledge unavailable to the
general population.93 Military commanders are required to comply
with “the means and methods of warfare” rules de jure,94 but they
would most likely apply those rules in a de facto way, since
misusing limited resources, such as ordnance or ammunition,
would result in future losses by targeting civilians instead of
incoming enemy troops.95 Furthermore, killing anyone, directly or
indirectly, is psychologically unsettling and weighs heavily on
military leaders.96
a. An aside on PGMs. Some jurists argue that the means and methods
of warfare subsection is instead about belligerent parties using the
most precise weapons available.97 It is understandable why
humanitarian NGOs want States to minimize casualties by being
able to target specific military combatants or objectives since
90. See Humphries, supra note 85, at 25–27. The Lotus principle might be invoked to
allow military officials to perform their duties to the fullest extent. See S.S. Lotus, supra note
42, at 42–43, 63.
91. Shales, supra note 87.
92. Notwithstanding Stanislav Galić’s prosecution for war crimes, see Prosecutor v.
Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 733–53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), most military officials are given much leeway in deference
to this standard.
93. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 17, at 797–826.
94. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Humanitarian Regulation of Hostilities: The Decisive
Element of Context, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 765 (2018).
95. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 17, at 797–99.
96. See, e.g., Jerold E. Brown, Discipline: The Execution of Private Eddie D. Slovik, in
COMBINED ARMS IN BATTLE SINCE 1939, at 83–87 (Roger J. Spiller ed., 1992); Shales, supra
note 87.
97. Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 801–03.
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blanket bombing may devastate the defending State physically,
politically, and psychologically. State practice does not require
PGMs,98 nor does treaty law.99 PGM advocates begrudgingly agree
that there is no legal obligation for States to acquire the most precise
weapons, not even for those with financial resources to do so.100
Even though the United States, Germany, Australia, and
Canada do not consider PGMs legally required,101 the United States
and NATO102 may view their use as a potentially feasible
precaution.103 Discussing the ever-improving technology and its
effect on armed conflict requires different States to agree on
complex and difficult issues.104 In both the 1983 Grenada rescue
operation105 and the December 1989 Panamanian installation of a
new government,106 the United States used precision bombing.107
When engaging Da’esh in Iraq, the United States changed its legal
language to “defensive precision strikes,”108 but it still remains the
same concept. Thus, over the last forty years, the U.S. government
has continually sought to use precision bombs to remain on good
terms with the governments of the States wherein it is engaging

98. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 38, at 52–58.
99. See Hays Parks, The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
65, 85–86 n.57 (1997). But see Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of
a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV.
115, 145–51 (2000) (discussing how emerging law, or rather the interpretation of the law by
NGOs, would require the use of more precise munitions, especially in urban areas).
100. See Walters Belt, supra note 99, at 145–51.
101. See DOD LOWM, supra note 23, § 5.11.6 n.376 (explaining that the German,
Australian, and Canadian Law of War Manuals all state that PGMs are not required).
102. See discussion supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
103. See DOD LOWM, supra note 23, at § 5.2.3.2.
104. See also discussion supra in note 81.
105. See RONALD H. COLE, OFF. CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS STAFF, OPERATION URGENT
FURY: THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF JOINT OPERATIONS IN GRENADA 12 OCTOBER – 2
NOVEMBER 1983 29 (1997), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/
Monographs/Urgent_Fury.pdf.
106. See Michael R. Gordon, Stealth’s Panama Mission Reported Marred by Error, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/04/us/stealth-s-panamamission-reported-marred-by-error.html.
107. See also Parks, supra note 39, at 155.
108. See, e.g., Stephen Losey, WATCH: Pentagon Releases Video of Airstrikes on Militia
Facilities in Syria, MILITARY.COM (June 28, 2021), https://www.military.com/dailynews/2021/06/28/watch-pentagon-releases-video-of-airstrikes-militia-facilities-syria.html.
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in armed conflict.109 Yet the United States and coalition forces
remain adamant in preserving PGMs not as custom but perhaps as
an option.
One of the biggest detractors regarding PGMs is their price
tag.110 Many military decisions are usually based on the resources
available to the belligerents.111 Even then, PGMs are some of
the most expensive weapons because of the high level of
production, calibration, and maintenance required.112 For emerging
PGM systems, there are many potential issues for a State to
take into consideration, including: quantities and stockpile
assessment (because these weapons are very expensive and
sensitive, they need higher standards of maintenance); supplychain security (because these require high-caliber types of
protection, they might be less desirable in times of war, especially
when an enemy is blitzing; creation of reliable development
timelines (China and Russia have developed more sophisticated
systems in the past ten years, which would leave other countries,
including the United States, to have to push themselves to catch
up);113 cost-effectiveness (e.g., using a $3 million Patriot missile
to shoot down a $300 quadcopter drone);114 and emerging

109. See COLE, supra note 105, at 29; Gordon, supra note 106 (“Mission: Disorienting
Soldiers”). It should go without saying that if you completely demolish a state’s military
forces, many possible outcomes are possible, including a power vacuum for the new
executive placed therein, anger towards the new government and the attacking force, and a need
to rebuild a vital yet difficult-to-replace infrastructure that requires a lot of organization.
110. See, e.g., JOHN R. HOEHN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45996, PRECISION-GUIDED
MUNITIONS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–5 (Feb. 27, 2020). From perusing the
prices of PGMs, it is apparent that they can cost a pretty penny. This has not been discussed
by any of the other authors who have discussed PGMs, but it is at least inherent in the
discussion that some who advocate for PGMs consider the cost of the value of a human life.
In the law of armed conflict, this appears to almost be a taboo: discussing the balance of a
human life compared to how much a conflict may cost in currency. It is not for this article to
engage in this conversation, but it is crucial to the discussion of this that there is some belief
by the military scholars (Corn, Infeld, Parks) that it can be highly expensive to the more
ICRC-minded academics (Murphy, Quéguiner), who consider the loss of life too egregious.
See discussion infra note 116.
111. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 17, at 801. “Don’t shoot until you see the whites of
their eyes” comes to mind.
112. See HOEHN, supra note 110, at 6–28.
113. See id. at 28–30.
114. See Chris Baraniuk, Small Drone ‘Shot with Patriot Missile,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 15,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39277940.
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technologies that might compete with this technology, such as
hypersonics, cyberwarfare, and artificial intelligence.115
There also seems to be no consensus of how to use PGMs; some
consider them as required for every attack, whereas others think of
them as a “silver bullet” which will destroy each and every target
and only the target.116 Yet one of the best arguments would be to
make a balancing test, left to the discretion of the military
commanders of each State, which would allow for less
economically developed States to use the available technology and
for more developed States’ reasonable military commanders to
make the decision depending on the needs of the situation.117
Hence, every State could exercise discretion in what weapons it
uses and possibly preserve PGMs for more important attacks,
especially in urban areas.118
3. Suspension or cancellation for excessive incidental loss of civilian life
and damage to civilian objects: articles 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(b), 57(3), 57(4)
Article 57(2)(a)(iii) lays down the rule of proportionality.119
Proportionality restricts attacks that cause excessive “incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.”120

115. See KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45811, HYPERSONIC WEAPONS:
BACKGROUNDS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2021) [hereinafter SAYLER – HYPERSONICS]; CHRIS
JAIKARAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45127, CYBERSECURITY: SELECTED ISSUES FOR THE 115TH
CONGRESS (2018); KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45178, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY (2020) [hereinafter SAYLER – ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE].
116. Compare Murphy, supra note 38, at 52–58 (arguing vehemently that precisionguided munitions should always be required), Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and
International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 453 (2005) (discussing how
aerial warfare reduces the risk of collateral damage and restrikes, which would end
hostilities faster than other methods), and Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 801–03 (echoing
Schmitt’s argument that the arguments against precision-guided munitions are weak), with
Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert
Storm; But Is a Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian
Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 109, 134–35 (1992) (extrapolating that
the law of armed conflict only mandates a balancing of military necessity and unnecessary
suffering), and Parks, supra note 39, at 189–97 (explaining that precision-guided munitions
are not feasible).
117. Cf. MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR
OPERATIONS 13–14 (Rand Corp. 2003). Although Waxman does not discuss this exactly to the
degree expressed here, it is implied as a potential argument.
118. See, e.g., DOD LOWM, supra note 23, at § 5.11.6.
119. See COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 683 nn.2204–07.
120. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
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This section should also be read in conjunction with article 57(2)(b),
wherein an attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes
apparent that the attack will result in a proportionality violation.121
These “prohibitions” are not to be read as absolute, presenting
“tactical and operational” categories for decision-makers to account
for in assessing an attack.122 Article 57(3) restates a custom that
belligerents already practiced when assessing attacks, such as
choosing to attack a railway line away from inhabited areas.123
Article 57(4) applies to attacks from sea or air against land military
objectives; since the laws of sea and air warfare were still unclear
when AP I was written, this rule is as general as possible to avoid
stepping on naval and air military leaders’ toes while still applying
the principle of proportionality.124
a. An aside on civilian objects. Creating an “excessive” incidental
loss on civilians and civilian objects and “all objects which are not
military objectives”125 of a defending State constitutes a war crime,
per articles 85(3)(b) and (c) and 85(5).126 Comparing the loss of
civilian life and damage to civilian objects and any other objects not
militarily advantageous with egregious violations of the law of war
seriously undermines the point of creating this higher standard of
121. Id. at art. 57(2)(b); see also COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 686 nn.2220–21.
122. See Corn, supra note 93, at 774.
123. See COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 687 nn.2226–28.
124. See id. at 687–89 nn.2229–37.
125. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 52(1).
126. Articles 85(3)(b) and (c) and 85(5) of AP I state:
(3) In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following acts shall
be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully, in
violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or
serious injury to body or health:
....
b. Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian
population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack
will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
c.
Launching an attack against works or installations containing
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
....
(5) Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol,
grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.
AP I, supra note 16, at arts. 85(3)(b), (c) & 85(5).
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war crimes and dismantles the credibility of AP I.127 W. Hays Parks
illustrates this: in the event where a military officer has to decide,
during an emergency, between jettisoning her payload on an empty
civilian structure or a yard full of children, effectively destroying
either, the choice should be obvious.128 It is this lack of distinction129
in AP articles 57(2)(a)(iii) and 85(3)(b) and (c) that has spurred
certain countries, like the United States, to criticize the International
Criminal Court.130
b. Military commanders and the law of armed conflict. The ICRC
127. Parks, supra note 39, at 149.
128. See id. at 147–49 (discussing how it is important to distinguish innocent civilians
and civilian objects, “[b]ut as a legally binding rule, Protocol I has raised the protection of
civilian objects to an unprecedented, unrealistic and unacceptable level.”). This standard is
understandable when considering the gravity of crimes. For instance, in the International
Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, almost all of the alleged crimes had to do with individuals
being killed, unlawfully imprisoned, forcibly transferred, or deported in conjunction with
the overall situation and result of the attack rather than the destruction of any particular
object. See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 45, 84 (2013); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement,
¶¶ 509–10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
129. The term “civilian objects” is a general concept wherein different countries have
diverse understandings of it. For instance, the United States Air Force has the same definition
as article 52(1), but the United States Naval Handbook in 1995 stated “all civilian property
and activities other than those used to support or sustain the enemy’s war-fighting
capability.” This definition was updated to the equivalent of article 52(1). See INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, PRACTICE RELATING TO RULE 9. DEFINITION OF CIVILIAN OBJECTS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule9. Whereas the United
Kingdom 2004 LOAC Manual states in 15.16.1:
There is no definition of civilian objects nor is the term used in the treaties dealing
with internal armed conflicts, but the principles of military necessity and
humanity require attacks to be limited to military objectives. Thus attacks on the
following are prohibited unless they are being used for military purposes: civilian
dwellings, shops, schools, and other places of non-military business, places of
recreation and worship, means of transportation, cultural property, hospitals, and
medical establishments and units.
U.K. JOINT DOCTRINE & CONCEPTS CTR., JSP 383: THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 393 § 15.16.1 (2004).
130. See, e.g., Donald Trump, U.S President, Remarks to the 73rd Session of the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-generalassembly-new-york-ny/ (“So the United States took the only responsible course: We
withdrew from the Human Rights Council, and we will not return until real reform is
enacted. For similar reasons, the United States will provide no support in recognition to the
International Criminal Court. As far as America is concerned, the ICC has no jurisdiction, no
legitimacy, and no authority. The ICC claims near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of
every country, violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process. We will never
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acknowledges that military necessity allows for collateral damage,
as long as the attacking States’ advances are militarily
advantageous.131 Article 51 formally recognizes that civilians are
not meant to be the object of attack, but article 57(2)(a)(iii) opens
this up to allow for loss of civilian life, as long as it is not “excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”132 The ICRC, however, also claims that
proportionality clarifies the type of attack and its justification by
weighing the humanitarian and military interests.133 The balancing
test in evaluating the attack and the strategic military advantage
should be solely in the purview of the reasonable military
commander,134 as allowed by articles 57(2)(b) and 57(3).
Most military commanders are aware of their duties in the law
of armed conflict, especially as to whom and what to target;135 but
they are also aware of the problems inherent in engaging with
irresponsible command.136 There can be no disproportionate
attacks, defined as causing “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, [or] damage to civilian objects” in excess compared to the
“concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” from that
attack.137 If military leaders allow for their subordinates to attack
surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy.”);
Robbie Gramer, Why Russia Just Withdrew from the ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2016,
10:18 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/why-russia-just-withdrew-from-iccputin-treaty-ukraine-law/ (explaining that many African countries have left the ICC for
alleged bias).
131. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 482 n.1605 (“[E]ven civilians are not totally
sheltered from military warfare, even in the best conditions.”).
132. See id. These differences are accounted for in article 57(5) by restating that nothing
in the preceding article allows for civilians to be targeted. See also O.R. XIV, supra note 35, at
51–58, for a discussion on article 57 in conjunction with article 51.
133. See COMMENTARY AP I supra note 30, at 683–84 nn.2207–09.
134. See, e.g., DOD LOWM, supra note 23, at § 18.2.1 (“For example, various military
doctrines, such as accuracy of targeting, concentration of effort, maximization of military
advantage, conservation of resources, avoidance of excessive collateral damage, and
economy of force are not only fully consistent with compliance with the law of war, but also
reinforce its observance. Use of indiscriminate and excessive force is costly, highly inefficient,
and a waste of scarce resources.”).
135. See, e.g., id. at §§ 5.10–12; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FIELD MANUAL 27-2: YOUR CONDUCT
IN COMBAT UNDER THE LAW OF WAR (Nov. 1984), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/conduct-in-combat-1984.pdf.
136. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Contemplating the True Nature of the Notion of “Responsibility”
in Responsible Command, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 901, 904–05 (2014).
137. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 51.5(b).
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disproportionately to the mission’s objective, they risk destroying
their troops’ psychological and mental welfare. Military leaders are
tasked with preserving their subordinates’ human dignity, as
Counsel for the Prosecution at the Nuremberg Trials Telford Taylor
wrote, “Another and, to my mind, even more important basis of the
laws of war is that they are necessary to diminish the corrosive
effect of mortal combat on the participants.”138 Vietnam War
veteran James McDonough, regarding his experiences as a platoon
leader, explained:
I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their
human dignity. I was making them kill, forcing them to commit
the most uncivilized of acts, but at the same time I had to keep
them civilized. . . . A leader has to help them understand that
there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to
order, to humanity. If the leader loses his own sense of propriety
or shrinks from his duty anything will be allowed. And anything
can happen.139

By upholding standards of discipline and applying the law of
armed conflict, military commanders create a more effective armed
force.140 Nevertheless, discipline and unquestioning obedience
does not equate to a good military unit; otherwise, the Japanese
forces that took Nanjing would be considered an effective armed
force.141 If all military commanders could institute complete
138. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 40 (1970).
139. JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, PLATOON LEADER: A MEMOIR OF COMMAND IN COMBAT
77–78 (1985).
140. See Corn, supra note 136, at 905–07; see also MCDONOUGH, supra note 139, at 71
(“Some men in combat will commit war crimes, just as some men in combat will fail to take
care of themselves. They will experiment with drugs, steal property, abuse women. When
this happens it destroys the discipline of a unit, making it easier for others to follow suit. War
is, at its very core, the absence of order; and the absence of order leads very easily to the
absence of morality, unless the leader can preserve each of them in its place. The leader has
to set the standards for morality as clearly as he sets the standards for personal hygiene or
weapons maintenance. He must allow no cutting of corners. A bottle of soda stolen from an
old peasant woman leads gradually but directly to the rape of her daughter if the line is not
drawn in the beginning.”). The ICRC has done much research on preventing armed conflict.
Much of this research hinges on what can cause a human being to commit war crimes or
crimes against humanity. See, e.g., Understanding the Roots of Behaviour of Combatants, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://e-brief.icrc.org/issue/generating-respect-for-thelaw/understanding-the-roots-of-behaviour-of-combatants/(last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
141. Scarred by History: The Rape of Nanjing, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/223038.stm; see also Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution
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discipline with perfect moral values, then article 57 would seem
redundant and unnecessary.142 Thus, it is important to train
commanders to be the most responsible people: people who will
not only be looked up to, but will think twice or be sufficiently
humble to ask for advice before making a difficult decision,
especially if it could be considered a war crime.143
c. Reasons why States choose to prevent excessive incidental loss,
injury, or damage. Anciently, attacking States salted down cities to
stop the land from being re-inhabited, partially as a sign of strength
and partially to add insult to injury.144 As recently as the last two
hundred years, a similar tactic was used—the “scorched earth”
policy—which devastated the land to prevent the defending State
from using those resources. For instance, see Sherman’s March to
the Sea, devastating Georgia, or Lord Kitchener’s advance against
the Boers in South Africa. Since then, salting and scorched earth
policies by attacking States have been effectively banned by AP I
article 54.145
Nevertheless, in the modern era, scorched earth policies could
be found legal if those policies were exercised by the defending
State with the intent of preventing or slowing down the advance of
enemy belligerents as long as non-essential objects are destroyed,
similar to Russia’s actions during Napoleon’s invasion.146 Many
attacking States prefer to maintain the land as is, especially if there
are valuable resources available to provide for their large army.147
Thus, despite the problems salting and scorched earth policies pose

of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, 835 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531,
533–38 (1999) (discussing superior orders and the Nuremberg defense, held under
international law as inadequate defenses). It could be implied by the Nuremberg defense
that military officials should actively disobey if orders are against the soldier’s morality
or conscience.
142. See discussion supra note 140.
143. See Corn, supra note 136, at 910–12.
144. See generally Judges 9:45 (Shechem is salted).
145. But see COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 658 nn.2116–23.
146. See id.; see also The Economic and Environmental Impact of the Gulf War on
Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, AM. U. https://web.archive.org/web/20101219043510/
http://www1.american.edu/ted/kuwait.htm, (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
147. For instance, part of the reason why the Iraqis burned oil wells in retreating was
that they saw it as a method of halting the U.S. forces thinking that the sole reason for the
United States and coalition invasion was to take over Iraqi oil. See The Economic and
Environmental Impact, supra note 146.
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on the local populace, a defending State may effectively destroy its
environment, hurt its people, or damage its own civilian objects.
Nonetheless, military commanders and soldiers are human
beings with moral compasses, who generally want to abide by the
humanitarian standards of the law of armed conflict. One of the key
objectives of an attacking State is to take or re-take possession of
lands and buildings and establish a new system of government
with the civilian population. If an attacking State annihilates an
area of land and people, there may be nothing and no one left to
occupy or rule over. Furthermore, an attacking State does not want
the defending State to destroy all its resources, especially if it could
use those resources. The law of armed conflict takes this type of
military strategy into account through article 54, which the ICRC in
the Commentary states “[r]espect for the environment . . . is
foremost in the conscience of nations.”148
Moreover, in creating obedience and discipline in troops,
wanton killing and excess destruction of the land and people would
completely undermine a military commander’s authority.149 The
law of armed conflict establishes the rule of law among a leader’s
troops or they may become an unruly “mob.”150 In many countries,
for instance, soldiers are required to disobey illegal or immoral
orders, especially in regard to the principle of proportionality.151
This legal disobedience is seen most aptly in Hugh Thompson,
Lawrence Colburn, and Glenn Andreotta’s courageous stand
against their fellow American troops by stopping the attacks on
civilians at My Lai, Vietnam.152 Although they were not recognized
for their valiant actions for many years, their actions nevertheless
represent the importance of military commanders in learning and
applying the law of armed conflict.153
Furthermore, in creating better relations with the newly
conquered people, it may even help for the local population to
148. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 662 n.2125. This is definitely not as strong of
a standard as it could be.
149. See Ulrich F. Zwygart, How Much Obedience Does an Officer Need?, COMBAT STUD.
INST. (1993), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csibooks/ObedienceOfficerNeed_Zwygart.pdf.
150. Brown, supra note 96, at 83.
151. See DOD LOWM, supra note 23, at § 5.10.2.4.
152. Heroes of My Lai Honored, BBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 1998, 10:01 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/03/98/mylai/62924.stm.
153. Id.
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know that the incoming State seeks to establish good relations with
the local populace. This may also help local leaders to know the
incoming State is orderly and willing to follow local law and
respect the old State’s military leaders.154
There are, however, some groups that do not trust State leaders,
military commanders, and soldiers. The ICRC proposes that
military leaders should consider the following to minimize losses,
injuries, and damage: location of a military objective, terrain (such
as creating landslides or floods), “accuracy of weapons used[,]”
weather conditions, “specific nature of the military objectives
concerned[,]” and “technical skill of the combatants.”155 By
incorporating these factors in the ICRC Commentary, it is likely
that the ICRC perceives that article 57(2)(a)(iii) is not as clear as it
would like it to be and would like to further define the
responsibilities and duties of military leaders.156 Other groups also
suggest raising the standard of intelligence-gathering to “reliable
information” or creating a threshold on the amount of intelligence
gathered before a State engages a target.157
d. Policy: The law is needed but other options might be taken. All
these reasons aside, the ICRC sensibly does not completely depend
on human agency when creating these standards because warfare
may bring out the worst in human beings. For example, when
thinking of many of the atrocities and horrors that have occurred in
the twentieth century, the My Lai Massacre may
come to mind. At My Lai, soldiers “went berserk,” beating and
gunning down unarmed men, women, children, and babies; raping
the women; and committing other horrendous war crimes.158
Considering these horrors, it is not difficult to understand why the
ICRC and others want to create these standards and policies and
enforce them through treaty and the international court system.
154. DOD LOWM, supra note 23, at § 18.2.3.
155. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 684 n.2212.
156. Id. at 685 n.2219.
157. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 798. This might be incredibly difficult as the ICRC
itself has listed such fact-specific factors in targeting. Nevertheless, when the ICRC, through
the Commentary, creates an understanding of these types of factors, certain States would see
these standards that the ICRC has attempted to implement and could make efforts to abide
by these standards.
158. Murder in the Name of War—My Lai, BBC NEWS (July 20, 1998),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/64344.stm.
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To prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity, the ICRC
hopes to couch military actions to the point that armed conflict does
not happen.159
Nonetheless, what would be easiest would be to ensure that
nothing like this happens by making sure the defending State also
protects its civilian population.160 In a perfect world, armed conflict
would not even be an issue, but unfortunately, there are many other
moments when military action is not only desirable but needed.
Defending States are not always looking out for their own civilians
and several acts of genocide have occurred in the last thirty years
among the Kurds, Tutsis, and Bosniaks. For instance, had there
been better procedure in the UN peace-keeping mission at
Srebrenica, thousands may not have been massacred,161 or had at
least a battalion been sent to Rwanda, 800,000 people might not
have been murdered, tortured, and raped.162
On the other hand, military interventions might be considered
as negative actions or intimidations by the U.S. military. For
example, George H.W. Bush’s overthrowal of Manuel Noriega and
the Clinton administration’s threat to depose the Cedras regime in
Haiti have been viewed poorly.163 No matter the reason for the
159. See generally IHL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–6. The ICRC might want to consider
alternative methods like focusing on educating the State’s military in the law of armed
conflict, while learning of novel technologies to avoid loss, injury, and damage to civilians
and civilian objects.
160. Parks, supra note 39, at 154–68.
161. See Michael Dobbs, To Stop a Genocide, Please Submit the Correct Form, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Apr. 5, 2012, 6:04 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/05/to-stop-a-genocideplease-submit-the-correct-form/ (arguing that had the Dutchbat commander Karremans
received the air support he required, the massacre would not have occurred); see also van
Uhm, supra note 87.
162. See Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2001),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-togenocide/304571/ (“It is not hard to conceive of how the United States might have done
things differently. Ahead of the plane crash, as violence escalated, it could have agreed to
Belgian pleas for UN reinforcements. Once the killing of thousands of Rwandans a day had
begun, the President could have deployed U.S. troops to Rwanda. The United States could
have joined Dallaire’s beleaguered UNAMIR forces or, if it feared associating with shoddy
UN peacekeeping, it could have intervened unilaterally with the Security Council’s backing,
as France eventually did in late June. The United States could also have acted without the
UN’s blessing, as it did five years later in Kosovo.”).
163. See ROBERT A. PASTOR, EXITING THE WHIRLPOOL: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 93–94, 112–14 (2d ed. 2001); Morris Morley & Chris
McGillion, “Disobedient” Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization; The Clinton
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aggression, any loss of life by military intervention, action, or
intimidation against the government of another country, despite
positive consequences, will be regarded with animosity, even if the
aggression could potentially save thousands.164 However, just
because military action results in some loss of life does not mean
that military action should not be used to prevent even worse
outcomes. Thus, in protecting civilians, perhaps the ICRC should
focus on cultivating better leaders and soldiers who would be
willing to follow General Douglas MacArthur’s belief that “[t]he
soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the
weak and the unarmed.”165
4. Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit: article 57(2)(c)
Article 57(2)(c) is the spiritual successor to article 26 of the 1907
Hague Regulations concerning the attacking State giving an
advance warning.166 The ICRC recognizes that this rule is limited
by the final phrase, “unless circumstances do not permit” to allow
for the element of surprise in the attack as a condition of its

Administration and Haiti, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 363 (1997); Michael E. O’Hanlon, Doing It Right: The
Future
of
Humanitarian
Intervention,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Sept.
1,
2000),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/doing-it-right-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention/;
Panama, HUM. RTS. WATCH (1989), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/
Panama.htm#TopOfPage (stating that there was a “generally sympathetic response of the
Panamanian population”).
164. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gonzalez, Gobierno de Panamá Declara 20 de Diciembre “Día de
Duelo Nacional” a 30 Años de la Invasión Militar de EE.UU. [Panamanian Government Declares
December 20 “Day of National Mourning” 30 Years After the U.S. Military Invasion], CNN EN
ESPANOL (Dec. 19, 2019), https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2019/12/19/gobierno-de-panamadeclara-20-de-diciembre-dia-de-duelo-nacional-a-30-anos-de-la-invasion-militar-de-ee-uu/
(explaining how the government has now perceived the invasion negatively); Peter Eisner,
Manuel Noriega, the Invasion of Panama and How George H.W. Bush Misled America, NEWSWEEK
(Mar. 18, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/2017/04/14/1067apan1067-trumpgeorge-hw-bush-fall-panama-noriega-570478.html (interviewing Noriega and how Bush misled
the United States, but also admitting to Noriega’s narcotrafficking and possible deaths at his
hands); see also discussion supra Section I.A.2.b. But that is the problem with military
intervention: the other timeline wherein the actions had the former political leader of the
defending State will never be known. The hope is that it does not become another Holocaust,
another Rwandan genocide, another Kurdish genocide, or another Armenian genocide.
165. Heroes of My Lai Honored, supra note 152.
166. Hague IV, supra note 75, at art. 26 (“The officer in command of an attacking force
must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to
warn the authorities.”); see also COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 686 n.2222.
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success.167 This section has been recognized as purposefully
“realign[ing]” AP I with custom.168 Effective advance warning
undercuts the usefulness of the element of surprise and removes
the responsibility of the defending State (or at least places an
unreasonable responsibility on the attacking State) from protecting
its own citizens. This latter responsibility of the defending State not
being obliged to protect its own citizens is concerning. For example,
in the First Gulf War, the Iraqi government conducted a major civil
defense exercise during which as many as a million or more
Baghdad residents evacuated the city, but during the forty-threeday coalition bombing of Iraq, no such evacuation ever occurred.169
The air warfare coalition dropped leaflets and issued radio
broadcasts warning Iraqi soldiers and civilians about the attacks.170
Defending States may have multiple reasons as to why they
would not evacuate or protect their own forces. Going back to the
First Gulf War example above, Iraqi leaders estimated the
coalition’s goals: Iraq had invaded Kuwait, but the Iraqis thought
that even though they might be pushed out of Kuwait, Iraq would
most likely be left alone. Then-United States Defense Secretary,
Dick Cheney, stated that toppling the regime was not the goal, but
a slight invasion would be sufficient to stop further incursions.171
At the time, Dick Cheney also postulated that the increased media
presence might show the negative perspectives of attacking States
and hold the coalition to a higher standard, knowing that the
presence of the media might affect how an attacking State might

167. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 686 n.2223.
168. See Parks, supra note 39, at 46 n.181. Of course, it is obvious that it is realigning AP
I with custom as most of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 have been taken to be
custom by now. See id.
169. See DOD PGW, supra note 84, at 1–17 (showing that the U.S. government recorded
many, if not all, of the actions taken by both sides).
170. Id. at xxi–xxii.
171. Charles Pope, Cheney Changed His View on Iraq, SEATTLE PI (Sept. 28, 2004),
https://www.seattlepi.com/national/article/Cheney-changed-his-view-on-Iraq-1155325.php
(“And the question in my mind is how many additional American casualties is Saddam
worth? . . . And the answer is not very damned many. So I think we got it right, both when
we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the president made the decision that
we’d achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems
of trying to take over and govern Iraq. . . . I would guess if we had gone in there, I would still
have forces in Baghdad today, we’d be running the country. We would not have been able
to get everybody out and bring everybody home.”).
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be viewed as invaders or colonizers.172 Finally, others argued that
the United States-led coalition would take more precautions
when knowing that there were Iraqi civilians present.173
By communicating in advance to the defending State, however,
the attacking State inevitably opens itself up to a more effective
defense and possibly more military deaths at the hands of the
defending State.174
Of course, an effective advance warning is extremely helpful in
protecting vulnerable civilians. Many civilians are unaware of the
complexities of warfare or do not have knowledge of potential
attacks. Notification is the base standard in protecting the people;
but there are many potential problems that arise from moving large
groups of people: knowing how to move large groups of people in
a short period of time, potential rioting and looting, and preparing
a safe location to move the civilian population into. The defending
State should be able to provide all of those options. In protecting its
people and their objects, the defending State could also provide
people with methods of transportation. Yet, when engaging with
an asymmetric belligerent with guerrilla tactics, who generally
does not provide any warning, it seems apparent that the defending
State (especially if they are engaging in guerrilla tactics) should
protect its own people. For instance, in 2014, Da’esh attacked the
Ninewa province in northern Iraq, kidnapping thousands and
killing hundreds, possibly thousands.175 Nevertheless, the Iraqi
government was aware that Da’esh would most likely attack cities
in that region and did nothing to warn its own population of the
impending attacks.176 Members of Da’esh, most likely accountable
for many acts considered to be war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide,177 will probably not issue an effective

172. See DOD PGW, supra note 82, at ix–xxviii.
173. Cf. Richard S. Lowry, The Battle of Al Busayyah, ARMCHAIR GEN. (June 15, 2004),
http://armchairgeneral.com/the-battle-of-al-busayyah.htm.
174. Humphries, supra note 83, at 36.
175. “Our Generation Is Gone”: The Islamic State’s Targeting of Iraqi Minorities in Ninewa,
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iraq-BearingWitness-Report-111215.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
176. Id.
177. See generally S.C. Res. 2490 (Sept. 20, 2019).
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advance warning.178 Thus, it should fall on the Iraqi government, if
it had sufficient knowledge,179 to protect its own minority
communities. The Iraqi government has not been held accountable
through article 58.180 This will be discussed more at length below.181
5. Targeting
Having some form of target or military objective, such as
eliminating a bridge that the opposing military may use or a highranking military official, has helped many States create a “center of
gravity” (“COG”).182 In deciding the center of gravity, different
military groups might have different goals in mind.183 For example,
during the First Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf did not want to
follow Secretary of Defense Cheney’s direction on finding and
destroying Scuds that were hidden as they were a bad military
target—the accuracy was poor and did not contain any payload of
poison gas—which led Schwarzkopf to disregard the issue.
178. Of course this could all be considered a NIAC, but Da’esh does not really claim a
home, see id., and it could equally be considered an IAC. See The Nature and Scope of the War
in Afghanistan, supra note 58 (discussing how even though it could be considered a NIAC,
because of the foreign nature of the belligerents, it could also be considered an IAC, even
when defending itself from belligerents).
179. Which in this case it did. See “Our Generation Is Gone,” supra note 175.
180. Id.
181. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
182. There is no surefire definition to this term; although Carl von Clausewitz created
the term, it has taken on a life of its own. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, II ON WAR 354 (J.J.
Graham, trans., 1918) (“[A] centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of
matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces
the greatest effect, and further as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity
of the power used, so it is also in War. The armed forces of every belligerent, whether a single
state or an alliance of states, have a certain unity and in that way, connection; But where
connection is there come in analogies of the centre of gravity. There are, therefore, in these
armed forces certain centres of gravity, the movement and direction of which decide upon
other points, and these centres of gravity are situated whether the greatest bodies of troops
are assembled. But just as, in the world of inert matter, the action against the centre of gravity
has its measure and limits in the connection of the parts, so it is in War, and here as well as
there the force exerted may easily be greater than the resistance requires, and then there is a
blow in the air, a waste of force.”); SEOW HIANG LEE, CENTER OF GRAVITY OR CENTER OF
CONFUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE MYSTIQUE 7–11 (1999), http://self.gutenberg.org/
eBooks/WPLBN0002170567-Wright-Flyer-Paper—Center-of-Gravity-or-Center-of-ConfusionUnderstanding-the-Mystique-Vol—by-Maj-Seow-Hiang-Lee-Republic-of-Singapore-AirForce.aspx?. But see Mark P. Krieger, Jr., We the People Are Not the Center of Gravity in an
Insurgency, 87 MIL. REV. 96, 96 (2007) (“[T]he source of power that provides moral or physical
strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”) (citation omitted).
183. See HIANG LEE, supra note 182, at 11–13.

1070

1071

Balancing Precautions in Attacks

Schwarzkopf realized that Cheney’s intuitions were right as
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi soldiers began firing Scuds at
civilians hundreds of miles away, in the nearby countries of Israel
and Saudi Arabia, instead of targeting the invading American
troops.184 Thus, by targeting the Scuds, American forces prevented
the losses of civilians hundreds of miles away.185
Civilians are not to be targeted directly.186 Cities are more
complex. For instance, when engaging in Iraq in 2003, the United
States sought to target Saddam Hussein as the military leader of his
country, but the only way it could do so would be to capture the
seat of government, Baghdad.187 In this instance, Baghdad, as the
capital city and location of power, was the center of gravity/target
providing moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will
to act for the defending State.188 As such, the United States had to
take Baghdad, which required warning the Baghdadi population
that the U.S. government would not target civilians nor their
property, a fact that was thoroughly communicated to the
Baghdadis in leaflets dropped and communications via radio,
television, and Internet.189 Ergo, this is a cognitively dissonant
mind-game military commanders must play with themselves
where they have to capture a city, which might be the method of
winning an armed conflict, but avoid hurting civilians and civilian
objects, which are more often than not located in cities.

184. Scuds are inaccurate ballistic missiles. See id. at 13; see also Mark Thompson,
Azadeh Moaveni, Matt Rees & Aharon Klein, Iraq: The Great Scud Hunt, TIME (Dec. 23, 2002),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,400021,00.html.
185. HIANG LEE, supra note 182, at 13; Thompson et al., supra note 184. With more drone
technology being used to kill people thousands of miles away and no treaties governing their
use, it may be likely that countries may engage in warfare without ever having to put “boots
on the ground” in a foreign territory.
186. AP I, supra note 16, art. 57(5).
187. See Robert Collier, Baghdad Closer to Collapse: Army, Marine Tanks and Troops Lay
Waste to Ministries, Capture Air Base, Repel Iraqi Counterattack, SFGATE (Apr. 9, 2003),
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=%2Fc%2Fa%2F2003%2F04%2F09%2FMN249161.DTL,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20120516050021/http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=%2Fc
%2Fa%2F2003%2F04%2F09%2FMN249161.DTL].
188. Krieger, Jr., supra note 182, at 96.
189. See discussion infra notes 248–249.
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C. Distinction
Article 57(2)(a)(i) specifies that the attacking State should do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives are neither civilians
nor civilian objects and not subject to special protection.
Historically, armed conflict has occurred both on battlefields in
the countryside and sieges of an urban center.190 Consequently,
armed conflict has developed alongside technological advances.191
For example, article 27 of the 1907 Hague Convention (No. IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land192 limited
the effect of attacks of sieges to protect areas where civilians
were located and the novel types of machinery and bombs
used in the disastrous sieges of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.193
Customarily, States have had differing opinions on their roles
during armed conflict: defending States have generally been in
charge of protecting their people, objects, and property; attacking
States have been in charge of not excessively attacking civilians.194
For instance, before the Siege of Leningrad, the civilian population
was informed of the impending hostilities and were mobilized to

190. For instance, in Jewish history, there have been famous sieges, such as Jericho, and
famous battlefields, such as the valley of Elah where David slew Goliath. See Michael J.
Broyde, Battlefield Ethics in the Jewish Tradition, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 92 (2001). In the
last 2,000 years there have been many famous sieges, such as the sieges of Jerusalem,
Tenochtitlan, Gibraltar, Sevastopol, and Leningrad; but there have also been many famous
battlefields, such as Antietam, Gettysburg, Verdun, the Somme, Pointe du Hoc. See Parks,
supra note 39, at 3–8; see also Amos C. Fox, The Reemergence of the Siege: An Assessment
of Trends in Modern Land Warfare, INST. LAND WARFARE PUBL’N (June 2018),
https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LPE-18-2-The-Reemergence-of-the-Siege-AnAssessment-of-Trends-in-Modern-Land-Warfare.pdf; R.W. Wallace, Famous Sieges, 61 J. ED.
91 (1905). There are nevertheless many modern-day sieges of cities as well as armed conflict
out in the countryside. See, e.g., Siege Watch, PAX, https://siegewatch.org/# (last visited Oct.
30, 2021).
191. Douglas D. Scott & Andrew P. McFeaters, The Archaeology of Historic Battlefields: A
History and Theoretical Development in Conflict Archaeology, 19 J. ARCHAEOLOGICAL RES. 103,
112–16 (2011) (explaining how battlefields and sieges developed according to the availability
of certain technologies).
192. 1907 Hague Convention IV with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (with
Annexed Regulations) (18 October 1907), in 60 INT’L L. STUD., DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF
WAR 76 (Howard S. Levie, ed., 1979).
193. See Wallace, supra note 190, at 92.
194. Parks, supra note 39, at 164 (“Protocol I is a conscious effort by the ICRC,
Switzerland, and Sweden—working through the Third World—to shift the responsibility for
collateral civilian casualties from the defender to the attacker.”).
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build up the fortifications. Some civilians even resisted by taking
up arms spontaneously against the invaders.195 In attempting to
take the city, the German and Finnish bombardment focused on key
areas to enter the city or the blockade itself.196 Most of the deaths
resulted not from bombardment or attacks, but from the blockade
into the city, wherein hundreds of thousands died solely because
of starvation.197
The legal principle of “distinction” between combatants and
civilians is one of the oldest military legal principles.198 Yet in the
era of total war, this principle was questioned for the first time by
academics since total war would require all people—soldiers and
civilians alike—to be used for the belligerent effort.199 In general, as
long as there is no levée en masse or a direct participation in
hostilities, civilians are protected.200 Therefore it falls on the
attacking State to gather good intelligence before attacking.
Gathering relevant intelligence requires identifying objectives,
distinguishing civilians from belligerents or unprivileged
combatants, and the belligerents’ uses for military purposes.201

195. See Constantine Krypton, The Siege of Leningrad, 13 RUSSIAN REV. 255, 255–57
(1954); see also James Clapperton, The Siege of Leningrad as Sacred Narrative: Conversations with
Survivors, 35 ORAL HIST. 49, 49–52 (2007) (a classic attempt of a levée en masse).
196. See Krypton, supra note 195, at 255–57.
197. See ANNA REID, LENINGRAD: THE EPIC SIEGE OF WORLD WAR II, 1941–1944 284
(2011); Pär Sparén et al., Long-Term Mortality After Severe Starvation During the Siege of
Leningrad: Prospective Cohort Study, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 11 (Jan. 3, 2004).
198. See H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRITISH
Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 74–75 (1944); cf. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 680 n.2194 (stating that
this “requirement of a precise identification of objectives should be especially welcomed,”
implying that this was a novel idea, when it is not a new standard).
199. See, e.g., JOHN SLESSOR, THE CENTRAL BLUE 213–14 (1957) (“[W]hy, for instance,
should Hans Schmidt, a fitter in the German Tank Corps servicing tanks at a base depot
outside Dusseldorf, be fair game while his civilian brother Fritz, who was assembling the
same tanks in Dusseldorf, be protected by law?”).
200. See Parks, supra note 39, at 120–24 n.378. Parks discusses how the democratization
of war has engaged in a total war mentality and brought in all sorts of civilians into the
conflict. For example, he discusses how militia units were used in the United States during
the American Revolution, conscription was mandatory for the First World War, how the
Ethiopian emperor mobilized the entire population during the Second World War, and
finally how the United States in the 1950s perceived war, as “every national of the one State
becomes an enemy of the other.” Id. (quoting The Law of Land Warfare ¶26, U.S. ARMY FIELD
MANUAL 27-10 (1956)). Nevertheless, he states that the democratization of war does not blur
the principle of distinction, just that it “has been in a state of erosion for more than two
centuries.” Id.
201. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 681–82 nn.2196–98.
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Therefore, the way the ICRC presents target verification implies
that it was meant to mitigate civilian risk and not to enhance the
effectiveness of the attack; but good military strategy would
naturally want to mitigate civilian risk and enhance the
effectiveness of the attack because of the limited resources.202
Thus, article 57(2)(a)(i) establishes, as treaty law, a higher
standard for the attacking State to gather the best intelligence
possible.203 This standard coincides with the principle of
proportionality discussed earlier wherein military commanders
need to be aware of who they target.204 In reiterating this standard
of gathering the best intelligence possible, the ICRC is not codifying
common sense but instead attempting to place a higher burden on
the attacking State to ensure that all protected classes remain
protected.205 Nevertheless, the defending State usually has
substantial control over their population and the terrain, with preplanned tactics, strategy, and incentive to protect its civilians from
all possible attacks.206 It would make more sense to require the
defending State to distinguish civilians and civilian objects by
providing better and more protections if the goal were to limit
civilian casualties.
If the ICRC hopes to help protected classes, then similar to
requiring an effective advance warning under article 57(2)(c), it
should require that the defending State in article 58(c), or in some
subsequent Additional Protocol, communicate in some form to the
attacking State and be provided with adequate knowledge and
information of protected places and people, such as a map
indicating special, protected locations—such as schools, hospitals,
and cultural sites—and restrict themselves from placing military
objectives or people within a certain distance. The UN has compiled
lists like that for armed conflicts.207 These types of maps might
202. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 17, at 801–02; see also Quéguiner, supra note 39,
at 797–99.
203. Nathalie Durhin, Protecting Civilians in Urban Areas: A Military Perspective on the
Application of International Humanitarian Law, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 177, 189–90 (2016).
204. See discussion supra Section I.B.2.b.
205. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 797; see also Corn & Schoettler, supra note 17,
at 801–02.
206. See WAXMAN, supra note 117, at 16 (quoted in Jensen, supra note 35, at 157).
207. See Evan Hill & Christiaan Triebert, 12 Hours. 4 Syrian Hospitals Bombed. One
Culprit: Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/
13/world/middleeast/russia-bombing-syrian-hospitals.html.
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undermine the element of surprise for the defending State but
ultimately this is no different than requiring the advance warning;
in fact, it could even lead to saving more lives.
When an attacking State does attack those areas, such attack
could be considered a blatant violation of the principle of
distinction and the law of armed conflict. For instance, the UN
created a list of protected locations for the Russian-Syrian-Da’esh
conflict. Some have claimed that Russia has used this list as a
“target menu” by prioritizing its assault solely on rebel Syrian
pockets on the list.208 Russia has stated though that from her own
resources and investigation, those targets were of military
necessity.209 Even though it might be difficult to prosecute violators
of these lists, being more adequately structured by treaty (which
would require buy-in by other States) or custom (which would take
some time) and held by a strong intergovernmental agency (the
U.N.), could render these lists very effective and protect civilians
even more. Nevertheless, in situations where the attacking State has
limited—or even faulty—information, it still seems that there
should instead be a higher burden on the defending State to protect
its own population than the attacking State in trying to identify
protected persons with limited information and attacking
important, strategic locations.
II. ARTICLE 58: HUMANITARIAN MILITARY NECESSITY
Article 58 discusses three separate actions that a defending State
may take to the maximum extent feasible: (a) endeavor to remove
the civilian population, individual civilians, and civilian objects; (b)
avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas; and (c) take other necessary precautions.210 Article 58 is
recognized by the ICRC211 and ICTY212 as the codification of
custom. However, custom actually has stricter requirements than
what Article 58 mandates. In contrast, the United States
Department of Defense Law of War Manual acknowledges that

208. Id.
209. See id.
210. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 58.
211. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 27, at 68.
212. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 733–53
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
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military commanders and other officials are responsible for the
safety of the civilian population, civilian objects, and cultural
property and must take reasonable steps to ensure that safety.213
A. An Aside on Breaching Article 58
Article 58 does not appear to be cited in litigation for the
International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice.214
At best, article 58 could be seen as a complement to the human
shielding prohibition in article 51(7). One academic claims that
violation
of
article
58
would
be
considered
“unexcused . . . noncompliance,”215 especially since it is not
mentioned in the Rome Statute as part of the extensive war crimes
section in its article 8 bis.216 This is part of the criticism W. Hays
Parks, Matthew Waxman, and others have leveled against AP I, by
restricting the role of the defending State, and laying all of the
blame on the attacking State.217
If the defending State fails to protect its civilian population,
there appears to be no repercussion; but if the attacking State fails
to notify civilians of an impending attack and then attacks, then the
attacking State could be accused of targeting civilians. For example,
in the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, the prosecution states
that the military commander of the attacking State, in lawfully
targeting the defending State, should have a legitimate military
objective.218 Yet the ICTY considered that article 58 had a lower
standard of “what is deemed feasible,” over the military
commander’s duties. Galić, however, also attempted to create a
defense: the defending State was required to remove the civilian
population under article 58 but failed to do so. Because of the lack
213. DOD LOWM, supra note 23, §§ 5.11.4, 5.12, 5.14, 5.18; see also Parks, supra note 39,
at 158–68 (arguing that AP I deviates from the custom by placing more of the blame on the
attacking State over the defending State, when throughout history, the defending State was
in charge of its own people).
214. Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 292, 304–05 (2009).
215. Id. at 305.
216. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9,
July 17, 1998.
217. For more discussion on this topic, see Jensen, supra note 35, at 155–57.
218. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 37, 58(Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); see also id. at ¶ 58 nn.104, 107 for a more
in-depth discussion.
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of protection under article 58, Galić changed his defense to the
defending State breaching article 28 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention (“GC IV”).219 The ICTY declared that the failure of the
defending State to comply with article 58 is not a valid defense for
the military commander of the attacking State; nevertheless, the
ICTY still considered it an offense.220
It is interesting to note the interchangeability between possible
defenses of both article 58 and article 28 of GC IV, which states:
“The presence of a protected person may not be used to render
certain points or areas immune from military operations.”221 This is
an interesting interplay, since in article 28 of GC IV, the attacking
State would have to prove that the defending State (or agent for the
defending State) intentionally kept the civilians there.222 This is an
argument used often in regards to voluntary human shields, and is
more often litigated than article 58, but it is so particular in its
application that article 28 of GC IV could only be brought against
individuals and cannot hold the State itself accountable.223 Article
28 of GC IV is often used in conjunction with article 51 to make sure
that the defending State does not use human shields,224 but it only
applies to an agent of a defending State, whereas article 58 holds
the whole defending State accountable rather than one individual.
Nevertheless, article 58 transcends the lower standard of stopping
a defending State from using human shields to uphold
humanitarian principles and precautions by protecting all civilians,
civilian objects and property, the city, and a State’s cultural
property225 even before an attack takes place.

219. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 40 n.70.
220. Id. at ¶ 61. It would not be brought up in court because no one was being
prosecuted in this instance.
221. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 28, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter GC IV].
222. See Parks, supra note 39, at 56–59.
223. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 815–17.
224. See Parks, supra note 39, at 162 n.484.
225. This falls in line with the spirit of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of
1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999,
2253 U.N.T.S. 172.
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B. Language and Implications of Article 58
Article 58, although it was meant to tie in with article 57,226 was
intentionally drafted broadly to allow for a defending State to
allocate its national defense in whatever way it deemed best.227 As
such, even its language has problems. For instance, the term
“feasible” was added, after much discussion, to allow for a
defending State’s military necessity.228 In this context, feasible
means everything practicable or practically possible.229 Thus, for an
attacking State, launching an attack requires a highly scrutinized
level of foresight and preparation within the State’s available
means, but for the defending State, there is a much more limited
foresight and preparation required prior to receiving an attack.230
Moreover, in article 58(a), the defending State should “endeavour”
to remove the civilian population and civilian objects from the
vicinity of military objectives, which flies in contrast “to the
maximum extent feasible.”231 Canada and Egypt recognized the
incongruence of both terms in the travaux preparatoires: If it were to
the maximum extent feasible, that can be a very high standard; but
if it should simply endeavor, then a defending State just needs to
show that it tried to protect its population.232 Egypt also takes
note that the phrase “densely populated” as used in article 58
contradicts the general principles found in article 51, but this was
never reworked in the Working Group, showing that even in
drafting article 58, this article was most likely not taken as seriously
as many other articles even though it was one of the original
articles drafted.233
Article 58 also implies foreseeability or “reverberating effects”
as to the types of precautions taken, such as assessing
unexploded ordnance, possible disruption of services, and
226. See O.R. XIV, supra note 35, at 181 ¶ 3.
227. See discussion supra note 37; see also COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 693 n.2248.
228. See COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 681–82 nn.2196–98.
229. See id.
230. This makes some sense as when receiving an attack because there might be little
warning, such as the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, when
the attacking State is beginning preparations to assault a defending State, some level of
precautions should be expected on the part of the defending State.
231. AP I, supra note 16, at art. 58(a).
232. See O.R. XIV, supra note 35, at 199 ¶¶ 10, 12.
233. See id. at ¶ 13.
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displacement of the civilian population.234 Furthermore, military
commanders of the attacking State and defending State hands are
tied up in trying to satisfy several different requirements, including
the “reasonableness”235 requirement in targeting others. Although
many States have employed advanced technologies to take into
account buildings, people, materials, and impact,236 not all
countries have the same accessibility to technology to do so or
might not use it effectively,237 which leads many defending States
to engage in asymmetric and guerrilla armed conflict. For example,
the Palestinian Arabs might not be able to compete with the
resources or organizational structure of the Israelis, and since the
Palestinians’ organizational structure has become increasingly
more fragmented, this has led them to more haphazard and
indiscriminate types of warfare, targeting Israeli soldiers but
unintentionally hurting Israeli civilians.238
On the other hand, Iraq, during the First Gulf War, began
storing military materiel in and near schools, medical facilities, and
places of worship, and although the United States and coalition
forces discovered the materiel, the Iraqis did so possibly to shield
legitimate targets from attack.239 Moreover, some consider that
Hussein followed the North Vietnamese strategy of shielding
military targets with civilian property and cultural objects.240 In
doing so, the United States would look bad from a “marketing”
standpoint if it attacked military targets so near civilians, civilian
property, and cultural objects, especially as it invaded Iraq. In this
case, the attacking State sidestepped the potential political fallout
by using PGMs.241 And even though the defending State is violating
the law of armed conflict by not removing its civilian population
234. IHL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17–18; see also Muhammedally, supra note 51, at 228.
235. See Corn, supra note 93, at 769.
236. See Corn & Schoettler, Jr., supra note 17, at 808.
237. James H. Doyle, Jr., Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military Operations, 76
INT’L L. STUD. 147, 149 (2002).
238. Abbas Kelidar, The Palestine Guerrilla Movement, 29 WORLD TODAY 412, 418–20
(1973). For a modern example, see Mashaal Calls for Guerrilla Warfare to ‘Liberate West Bank’
and ‘All Palestine,’ TIMES ISRAEL (Dec. 15, 2018, 4:04 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/
mashaal-calls-for-guerrilla-warfare-to-liberate-west-bank-and-all-palestine/.
239. Humphries, supra note 85, at 33–34. The intent is difficult to determine, and its
analysis is best left to those with the full evidence.
240. See id. at 34–35.
241. See id.
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from harm, not avoiding locating military objectives near densely
populated areas (which might be circumscribed if the cultural
objective is nowhere near a densely populated area), or not taking
other necessary precautions; the attacking State will naturally look
like the aggressor since it could be accused by the defending State
of attacking civilians and civilian objects.242
1. Removing the civilian population
Removing a civilian population from its home, as per article
58(1), presents a State with many problems. Displacement disrupts
the fabric of a community: it leaves family members with no
knowledge of one another’s whereabouts or well-being; it destroys
the economy of a nation; it necessitates other areas of a State or
other States to be willing to provide help and/or refuge; and it
creates psychological and emotional problems for those who
undergo it.243 Forced displacement is prohibited by the GC IV,244
but in a time of great crisis, displacing one community is likely a
better move than losing the whole population.245
It seems presumptive that a defending State should anticipate
attacks regularly, or that it should prepare its urban populations
long before any attack comes. Yet after the terrorist attacks on the
United States during September 11, 2001, the nature of armed
conflict has evolved to account for these types of attacks.246 Even
before the attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, the ICRC
Commentary discussed the need for defending States to remove
civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives and to create
evacuation plans, even in peacetime.247 As a contrast, looking at the
242. Id.
243. IHL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, 18–19, 24–25.
244. GC IV, supra note 219, at art. 49.
245. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 693 n.2247. This is also another huge problem
referred to in Section I.B.2.b, wherein there seems to be a disconnect between civilians and
civilian objects and their equality as war crimes, but even the ICRC does not equate them as
equally illegitimate.
246. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission (RSM):
Key Facts and Figures, Feb. 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
2020/2/pdf/2020-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf.
247. See COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30 at 693–94 nn.2247, 2249. Nevertheless, the
ICRC still attempts to place more responsibility on the attacking Power by reminding it of
its need to comply with the provisions of article 49 of the Fourth Convention (which it would
still need to comply with anyway). Id. at 693 n.2248.
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Second Gulf War, there were not any formal evacuation plans
created by the Iraqi government for its own population in Baghdad
or Mosul; at most, the Iraqi Information Ministry declared that it
could not guarantee the safety of civilians in Baghdad.248 United
States leaders issued several warnings to civilians in Iraq some time
before the attack on Baghdad via radio, television, and the Internet,
and the USAF dropped over 200,000 leaflets in Baghdad during the
weeks prior, warning civilians to stay in their homes and assuring
them that the campaign was not against them, but against
Saddam.249 In taking Baghdad, over 8,000 died in Baghdad alone,
with another 20,000 civilian injuries.250 Those people could have
been protected had the defending State had an evacuation order in
place for its capital city.251
Tangentially, regarding civilian objects: if civilian objects are
capable of being removed, the defending State should be in charge
of removing those objects when under threat of attack, per article
58(a). Yet practice dictates that the attacking State is responsible for
any harm that should befall the civilian object, and not the
defending State, even with adequate notice.252 For example, for the
United States in Iraq, from 2003–2007, about 500 claims have been
issued by the United States government to Iraqi citizens for civilian
property.253 Of course, with a regime change and destabilization of
248. Jon Lee Anderson, The Bombing of Baghdad, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23, 2003),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/03/31/the-bombing-of-baghdad.
249. Id.; see also Simon Jeffery & Rebecca Allison, US Forces Occupy Palaces, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 7, 2003, 7:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/07/iraq.politics;
Gregg Zoroya & Vivienne Walt, From the Battered Streets of Baghdad, It’s Clear: ‘The Battle Has
Reached Us’, USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2003, 10:58 PM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/world/iraq/2003-04-06-baghdad-usat_x.htm.
250. SABYA FAROOQ, ISABELLE GUITARD, DAVID MCCOY & JACK PIACHAUD, CONTINUING
COLLATERAL DAMAGE – THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF WAR IN IRAQ 4 (Jane
Salvage ed., 2003), https://www.medact.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Medact-2003The-Health-Environmental-Costs-of-War-on-Iraq-2003.pdf. This report was created by a
medical peace NGO. It estimates between 7,757–9,565 civilians died in total (including the
Baghdadi numbers).
251. See Anderson, supra note 248.
252. See Cora Currier, How the U.S. Paid for Death and Damage in Afghanistan, INTERCEPT
(Feb. 27, 2015, 7:22 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/02/27/payments-civiliansafghanistan/.
253. Press Release, Am. Civ. Liberties Union, ACLU Releases Files on Civilian
Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq (Apr. 12, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/aclu-releases-files-civilian-casualties-afghanistan-and-iraq?redirect=national-security/
aclu-releases-files-civilian-casualties-afghanistan-and-iraq.
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the government, it would be difficult for the former government to
issue reparations. Nevertheless, if the Iraqi government knew
about the impending attacks, article 58(a) would have required
them to have done more to protect its important sites. Some of the
important sites hit included the Republican Palace and the Council
of Ministers.254 Although the attacking State may be the one
initiating the attacks, and if feasible, it should avoid destruction of
civilian objects, the defending State (perhaps because of the
potential regime change) may be absolved for inaction.255
2. Densely populated areas
The global urban population in 1950 was about 751 million
people.256 As of 2018, about 55% (4.2 billion) of the world’s
population lives in urban areas, which is expected to increase to
68% by 2050.257 Most of this urbanization is taking place in Asia
and Africa, with about 2.5 billion more people expected to live
in cities by 2050.258 Mega cities are also growing, with Tokyo
leading the way with an agglomeration of 37 million inhabitants,
with eight other cities worldwide with more than 19 million
inhabitants each.259 With such increased urbanization, population
density must also be considered. Tokyo, the largest mega city in the
world, has about 4,750 people per square kilometer; Mumbai has
the highest density of mega cities with about 29,650 people per
square kilometer;260 in comparison, New York, the largest
metropolitan city in the United States, has about 5,320 people per
square kilometer.261

254. See Anderson, supra note 248.
255. See, e.g., Currier, supra note 252. Thousands of claims have come to light, much
more than those first four years of occupation.
256. 68% of the World Population Projected to Live in Urban Areas by 2050, Says UN, UN
(May 16, 2018), https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html [hereinafter 68% of the World].
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Elzy Kolb, 75,000 People Per Square Mile? These Are the Most Densely Populated
Cities in the World, USA TODAY (July 11, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/world/2019/07/11/the-50-most-densely-populated-cities-in-the-world/39664259/.
261. U.S. Census Urban Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/geo/
docs/reference/ua/ua_list_all.txt (last visited Sept. 27, 2021).
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As such, this increased urbanization mixed with high
population densities complicates protecting a State from liability
in defending its civilians. For example, in 1940, Tokyo had a
population of 7.35 million people; by 1945, it fell to 3.49 million
people; and by 1950, it rose to 6.28 million.262 On March 10, 1945,
when U.S. B-29s dropped about 1,665 tons of bombs on Tokyo,
about 100,000 civilians were killed in that one night with another 1
million residents displaced.263 Tokyo would be bombed 106 times
total, with increasingly strategic firebombing, intentionally
targeted since most Japanese cities were made of wood.264 In
comparison, Dresden was also attacked via firebombing and had
60,000 deaths overall.265 The purpose of these attacks was meant to
intimidate the Japanese into surrendering, but the attacks yielded
little progress toward that goal.266 Subsequent attacks on cities
might not be as devastating to the population, but could be more
strategic. Hiroshima and Nagasaki immediately lost about 70,000
and 40,000 people, respectively.267 Hiroshima was chosen because
it had a military base; Nagasaki was chosen as a last-minute change
from Kokura268 for its strategic import as a port.269 As a result of
these types of attacks, the ICRC has consistently pushed to curb
attacks on cities.270
Thus, it makes sense that with large population centers, and
with increased urbanization, there should be plans in place by the
defending State to counter potential sieges. These same densely

262. Tokyo’s History, Geography, and Population, TOKYO METRO. GOV’T,
https://www.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/ENGLISH/ABOUT/HISTORY/history03.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2021).
263. Robert D. Eldridge, The March 1945 Firebombing of Tokyo and the Immorality of
War, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/09/
commentary/japan-commentary/march-1945-firebombing-tokyo-immoralitywar/#.XoilqIhKjIU.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Fact File: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 6 and 9 August 1945, BBC (Oct. 15, 2014),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a6652262.shtml.
268. Kokura had an arms factory. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Kokura, Japan: Bypassed by
A-Bomb, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/07/world/kokurajapan-bypassed-by-a-bomb.html.
269. Fact File: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 6 and 9 August 1945, supra note 267.
270. François Bugnion, Remembering Hiroshima, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (June
30, 1995), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jmge.htm.
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populated areas also house important political and, thus, military
targets, such as the president or prime minister of a country. Since
it might be difficult to try to create new military operations in
densely populated locations, it might be easier to create systems
with the local regional governments who have a better
understanding or knowledge about how to protect their civilian
populations. Countries with complex jurisdictional questions, such
as the United States, might also prefer to work with local city,
county, and state leaders to determine potential emergency
military situations and resolutions for those problems.271
3. Military bases
As aforementioned in section B.2 of this Part, Hiroshima was
targeted for having a military base, Kokura for having an arms
factory, and Nagasaki for having an important port.272
Unfortunately, for small States, there will be a natural disadvantage
for any cities with military bases located nearby.
Article 58 sets up a standard that makes it difficult for smaller
and more impoverished States to fend off larger, attacking States.
Smaller States are more likely to have a denser population273 and
will thus be more likely to be unable to move their populations
anywhere else in an attack or avoid locating their populations near
military objectives. As such, small States are looking to expand
military bases into other States. For instance, in the last twenty
years the Netherlands created a pseudo-military base in the United
States,274 Singapore established multiple bases in Australia and

271. These emergency situations have still not been discussed in certain situations in
the United States. See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, 2018 DOMESTIC
OPERATIONS LAW HANDBOOK 5 (2018).
272. See supra notes 262–270 and accompanying text.
273. See Hannah Ritchie, Which Countries Are Most Densely Populated?, OUR WORLD IN
DATA (Sept. 6, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/most-densely-populated-countries.
274. Dutch ‘Viper’ Training in Arizona, AIR FORCES MONTHLY (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://airforcesmonthly.keypublishing.com/2018/04/05/dutch-viper-training-in-arizona/.
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considered a base in New Zealand,275 and the United Arab Emirates
expanded bases in Eritrea,276 Libya, Somaliland, and Yemen.277
Moreover, States with a higher population density, even if they
are geographically much larger, might argue that it is not feasible
to not have a military base near a significant population. Military
bases themselves might create a highly dense population within
and without in subsistence. Military bases are large and
accommodate many important aspects to military logistics, such as
accommodation for materiel; housing, transport, and
accommodations for personnel; construction, maintenance, and
disposition of facilities and services; and medical, health, legal, and
religious service support.278 Moreover, although many of these
bases are generally meant to be located far from populated areas to
minimize potential threats to the civilian population, they must still
be close enough to dispatch to a selected area as quickly as
possible.279 Military bases also need many civilians to help run the
day-to-day operations and maintain them (janitors, construction
workers, IT specialists).
In 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked, 2,335 military
personnel were killed, as well as 103 civilians.280 The Navy brought
the Pacific Fleet to Pearl to act as a deterrent to the Japanese.281

275. Kirsty Lawrence, Singapore Air Force Flies in to Ohakea for Flying Training,
MANAWATŪ STANDARD (Aug. 2, 2017, 6:21 PM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/manawatustandard/news/94864316/singapore-air-force-flies-in-to-ohakea-for-flying-training; Rob
Taylor, Singapore, Australia Expand Military Partnership with Eye on China, WALL ST. J. (May 6,
2016, 3:27 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/singapore-australia-expand-militarypartnership-with-eye-on-china-1462519648.
276. Now defunct after the writing of this Note. Jon Gambrell, UAE Dismantles Eritrea
Base as It Pulls Back After Yemen War, AP News (Feb. 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/
eritrea-dubai-only-on-ap-united-arab-emirates-east-africa-088f41c7d54d6a397398b2a825f5e45a.
277. Somaliland Agrees to UAE Military Base in Berbera, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38956093; UAE Operating an Airbase Near Marj:
Report, LIBYA HERALD (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/10/28/uaeoperating-an-airbase-near-marj-report/.
278. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FIELD MANUAL 4-0 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (2003),
https://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DODDOA021333.pdf.
279. Id. at § 3-86.
280. U.S. Census Bureau History: Pearl Harbor, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/homepage_archive/2016/december_2016.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2021).
281. Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S. NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND,
https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/organization-and-administration/
installations/naval-station-pearl-harbor.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2021).
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Of those civilians killed, there were firemen from Honolulu,
shipyard employees, construction workers, a restauranteur, and
children of some of those workers. Most of these deaths were
related to the running of a military base.282 Although it has been more
than seventy years since the attack on Pearl Harbor, there are still
many military bases in the United States today that are surrounded
by civilians or that employ thousands of civilian workers.283
Military bases becoming impromptu cities is not limited to the
U.S. military. For instance, Catterick Garrison is the largest U.K.
military base, has a “vibrant town centre.”284 Haifa has a population
of more than 283,600 people near three military installations (a
naval base, Air Force Technical College, and Camp Jalame
nearby).285 Even Russia established its largest air base deep in
Siberia, but the base is still within thirty kilometers of two cities
totaling more than 80,000 people.286
Moreover, the ICRC Commentary on the travaux préparatoires
on article 58 discuss the importance of defending States in clearing
moveable civilian objects from as far away as possible from military
objectives, such as food depots.287 The ICRC also discusses that “the
circumstances of war can change very rapidly and a building or
installation which does not seem to be of any military interest can

282. U.S. Census Bureau History: Pearl Harbor, supra note 280.
283. See Samuel Stebbins & Evan Comen, America’s Military Cities, 24/7 WALL ST. (Aug.
13, 2018, 6:32 PM), https://247wallst.com/special-report/2018/08/13/americas-militarycities/. For instance, Fort Campbell, with more than 67,000 military members and families,
is located close to Clarksville, Tennessee/Kentucky, and Fort Campbell represents only
23.9% of the greater metropolitan area. Id. Fort Bragg, which is one of the largest military
bases in the world, has more than 117,000 military and family but represents only about
30.9% of the Fayetteville, North Carolina population. Id. More examples can be given, but it
can be surmised that if one of these military bases were attacked, then the greater
metropolitan area might suffer catastrophically, as they have larger populations than
Hiroshima or Nagasaki had.
284. Northern Super Garrison, ARMY: U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://army.mod.uk/
structure/28835.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/20130224035738/http://army.mod.uk/
structure/28835.aspx] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021).
285. See Localities and Population, by Type of Locality and Population Group, ISR. CENT.
BUREAU OF STAT. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/doclib/
2019/2.shnatonpopulation/st02_21x.pdf.
286. Number of Districts, Urban and Rural Settlements by Subjects of the Russian Federation,
RUSS. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/
croc/Documents/Vol1/pub-01-03.pdf.
287. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 693 n.2249.
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quickly become a major military objective.”288 By allowing for
military bases to be created, even near civilian populations,
civilians, and civilian objects, the ICRC itself recognizes the
difficulty in trying to construct a base and keep it civilian free.
Those civilians must be evacuated if they are in danger of being a
result of military objectives.289 Thus, it lends itself that defending
States who construct military bases are performing military
operations with those civilians and are thereby tasked with
protecting the local civilian population from any damage.
Although article 58 applies as treaty law to certain countries,
customary international law also holds that defending State
populations are primarily responsible for limiting collateral civilian
casualties.290 Now-retired USAF Lieutenant Colonel John G.
Humphries explained that in the United States’ involvement in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, customary
international law required that the Iraqi government had a shared
obligation to protect its own citizens by evacuating them prior to
shelling. This obligation was important especially since the Iraqi
government had prior knowledge that the United States and
coalition forces were on their way to take Baghdad. This
foreknowledge of an impending war, could counter the Iraqi
government’s argument that the United States and coalition forces
were primarily responsible for devastating Iraq during the war by
failing to warn them when they would attack.291 Humphries argues
that from a legal perspective, the “lack of warning” makes no sense
because the element of surprise is a principle of war.292 Yet the ICRC
and its advocates would argue otherwise.293 For example, former
Colonel W. Hays Parks of the United States Marine Corps Reserve’s
seminal Air War and the Law of War’s analysis on AP I lays out that
the interpretation of the shared obligation of the protection of the
civilian population lies almost exclusively to the attacker.294
288. Id.
289. Id. at 694 n.2250.
290. See generally Infeld, supra note 116, at 114 (citing several examples of how this happens).
291. Humphries, supra note 85, at 25, 36–37.
292. Id. at 36.
293. See Murphy, supra note 38, at 60–62.
294. Parks, supra note 39, at 168. Pages 142 through 168 should be read in their entirety
as Parks goes through AP I in its entirety and discusses the problems in the ICRC’s
re-interpretation of the law of armed conflict in laying the blame almost exclusively on the
attacking State.
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Nonetheless, in all of this conversation about naming and blaming
the attacking or defending State as more culpable, the idea of
protecting civilians almost falls to the wayside.
In protecting urban areas that have cropped up around military
bases, it would be of even greater import for the defending State to
create even more protections of its local civilian population, not just
for humanitarian purposes, but for military necessity. In these
situations, the military would find it prudent to protect civilians
who do so much to help the military infrastructure and normal
activities on the bases.
4. Other measures
Finally, when discussing the other measures that can be taken,
the ICRC Commentators discuss creating shelters and well-trained
civil defense services.295 Most of this discussion deals with domestic
political issues and infrastructure, but if this would promote better
protection of civilians, then that might be the devil’s bargain. This
analysis stems from the fact that the ICRC did not want to limit
defending States in protecting itself.296 Nevertheless, other
academics have discussed that there are other obligations on
civilian authorities as well as the armed forces in article 58(3), 297
such as “providing relief to the wounded, . . . decontamination, and
identification and marking of high-risk areas.”298 In perusing the
types of other measures that a city may utilize, there was little
State practice, as many cities were simply left unprotected.299
295. COMMENTARY AP I, supra note 30, at 694–95 nn.2257–58.
296. See notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
297. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, FIGHT IT RIGHT: MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT FOR SPECIAL FORCES 78 ¶ 1201.5(c) (Geneva 1999).
298. See Quéguiner, supra note 39, at 818–19.
299. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 248; Humphries, supra note 85, at 36–37. What is
interesting however is that even a cursory search into protecting cities from attacks brought
up many instances of protecting cities from cyberattacks. Although this essay devotes itself
entirely to protection from physical attacks, it is interesting to note the sheer scale of possible
cyberattacks (such as ransomware attacks) and how devastating this can be to a city. See, e.g.,
Protecting Our Data: What Cities Should Know About Cybersecurity, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (2019),
https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CS-Cybersecurity-Report-Final_0.pdf;
Protecting Cities and Towns Against Cyber Attacks, EXECUTECH, https://www.executech.com/
insight/cyber-threats-to-cities-and-towns/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2021) (trying to sell
cybersecurity in the form of sponsored content); Gordon Feller, Protecting Our Cities from
Cyber Attacks, MEETING MINDS (Aug. 2, 2017) https://meetingoftheminds.org/protecting-

1088

1089

Balancing Precautions in Attacks

As discussed before, military leaders should also be required to
know the law of armed conflict; but it would also be helpful if they
were to have some other form of accountability to verify their
understanding of the law of armed conflict, at least as understood,
declared, or reserved to by their political leaders in treaty and in
accordance with State practice and other customs.
If anything, more options should be given to defending States
in article 58(3) to provide other alternatives to protect their
civilians. With emerging technologies, there might be other options
such as increased fortifications, anti-aircraft guns, drone
technology, better infrastructure,300 increased securitization, and
layering.301 Military leaders should also be instructed in these new
types of technologies, to be able to best identify what could be
potential options in protecting civilians. With increased
urbanization, States should consider investing more in their largest
cities, especially with substantial portions of their populations
living in those areas.302
Thus, under article 58, defending States should have a larger
role in protecting civilians during an urban armed conflict by
helping in removing the civilian population and preparing them a
location to move to, helping protect civilian objects whenever
possible, evacuating military bases of civilians, working with local
cities and populated areas to determine emergency situations, and
creating shelters and civilian defense-systems.

cities-cyber-attack-22181 (more sponsored content); Robert Muggah & Marc Goodman, Cities
Are Easy Prey for Cybercriminals. Here’s How They Can Fight Back, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 30,
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/our-cities-are-increasingly-vulnerableto-cyberattacks-heres-how-they-can-fight-back/; Ten Ways to Protect Your City from
Cyberattacks, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://citiesspeak.org/2019/10/21/tenways-to-protect-your-city-from-cyberattacks/; Niam Yaraghi, How Can City Governments
Protect Themselves Against Ransomware Attacks?, BROOKINGS INST. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/11/how-can-city-governmentsprotect-themselves-against-ransomware-attacks/. All of these articles discuss to some extent
the potential cyber breaches and the necessity to protect cities from this. More could be
written on this subject, but it is not within the scope of this Note.
300. Debika Ray, Defensive Realms: Protecting Cities from Terrorism, POSSIBLE (Dec. 2018),
https://www.the-possible.com/defensive-realms-security-technology-protection-terrorism/.
301. See Anderson, supra note 44.
302. 68% of the World, supra note 256. Eighty-two percent of the North American
population lives in an urban area, with another 81% for Latin America and the Caribbean;
74% of Europe’s population lives in an urban area, and 68% in Oceania. Id. Asia and Africa
are still substantially more rural, but their urban areas are among the largest in the world. Id.
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III. FUTURE ISSUES OF URBAN ARMED CONFLICT
No one seeks out urban armed conflict: it “is costly to the
attacker, defender, innocent civilians, and civilian objects.”303 In
considering potential future problems in preparing for urban
armed conflict, the two most preeminent dynamics to consider are:
types of warfare (as NIACs and IACs merge) and the ever-changing
nature of international law in connection with emerging technologies.
A. Types of Warfare
The United States has become engaged in several long-term
armed conflicts in the past thirty years, remarkably more than in
any other generation.304 Warfare, in conjunction with technology,
has changed substantially: it is no longer as common to see soldiers
fight by charging down a battlefield.305 Instead warfare comes in
different ways: drone strikes ordered by an executive branch of a

303. John-Hopkins, supra note 86, at 471.
304. CONG. RSCH. SERV., U.S. PERIODS OF WAR AND DATES OF RECENT CONFLICTS,
RS21405 1–10 (2019). The combined efforts of the Afghani (Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel) and Iraqi (Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn,
and Operation Inherent Resolve) each have lasted more than 140 months. Id. at 6–10. Most
other wars have lasted less than sixty months: the War of 1812 lasted thirty-one months; the
Mexican-American War lasted twenty-two months; the Civil War lasted sixty months; World
War I lasted less than twenty months; World War II lasted about sixty months, the Korean
Conflict lasted about fifty-five months. Id. at 2–4. Yet there have been wars wherein the
United States was involved for longer than twenty years: the Indian Wars (between the
United States and various tribes such as the Cherokee, the Seminoles, and the Lakota) lasted
for eighty-one years and the Vietnam War lasting for more than 140 months. Id. at 1, 4–5.
305. Cf. Sean Rayment, British Battalion ‘Attacked Every Day for Six Weeks’, TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
12,
2004),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews
%2F2004%2F06%2F13%2Fwirq113.xml [https://web.archive.org/web/20040812193042/
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2004%2F06%2F13%2F
wirq113.xml]; Nettempereur, French Peacekeepers Assault on the Vrbanja Bridge—Bosnian War,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PAPox1A3F6U (extracted
from the French TV report “Infrarouge – Que sont nos soldats devenus?”).
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distant government;306 cyberattacks;307 and space warfare.308 As
such, it is difficult for smaller States to engage in war with larger
ones, especially those who dedicate so much of their GDP to
military spending, leading to asymmetry.309 In fact, many smaller
States can ill afford to manufacture their weapons and instead
import them from other nations.310 One of the biggest issues for
smaller States is to instead change their tactics and strategies by
attacking how they can: through asymmetric and guerrilla warfare.311
Part of the reason why long-term armed conflicts last for so long
depends on the types of conflicts, whether an NIAC or an IAC, as
well as how to “win the war” and what constitutes the best center
of gravity.312 When there is no targetable location or strategy in the
methodology of war, it becomes much more difficult for the armed
conflict to be finalized. Throughout history, armed conflicts with a
goal or strategy depended partially on taking over the capital city
or overthrowing the monarch.313 When a city was not taken over,
or rather, when different portions of the State were taken over,

306. See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Pentagon’s General Counsel
Defends the Legality of the Soleimani Strike, LAWFARE (Mar. 11, 2020, 3:28 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/pentagons-general-counsel-defends-legality-soleimanistrike (showing the problems of attacking a military commander, especially one not currently
in armed conflict, with the push of a button).
307. See, e.g., Damien McGuinness, How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415 (discussing the first true cyberattack
that devastated a State). This cyberattack led to the establishment of the Tallinn Manual.
308. See, e.g., David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the
Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1200–22 (2009) (describing the
issues of satellites and the conflicts that can emerge indirectly).
309. See Max Roser & Mohamed Nagdy, Military Spending, OUR WORLD IN DATA,
https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending#citation (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
310. See Parks, supra note 39, at 139 n.412 (discussing in particular how this may
lead to targeting issues, as smaller States try to outdo each other by destroying their
limited economies).
311. See John-Hopkins, supra note 86, at 469–72 (discussing the history of asymmetric
armed conflicts); see also Estreicher, supra note 39, at 428–31 (explaining what law applies to
asymmetric armed conflicts and what law does not); Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznai,
Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94–99 (2011) (arguing that human shields—against article 51—are
increasing because of asymmetric armed conflict).
312. John-Hopkins, supra note 86, at 472.
313. See discussion supra note 190.
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prolonged warfare could result, such as the Hundred Year War.314
In the last hundred years, warfare has adapted and changed into
proxy wars,315 wherein multiple countries have engaged in NIACs
over the traditional IAC model.316
NIACs, however, present a much more difficult situation in
trying to accomplish a goal or injure a center of gravity. For
instance, the United States is still engaged in Iraq to rid Iraq of
Da’esh. The issues in Iraq have evolved from getting rid of its
former dictator to establishing a democratic system of government
to destroying a new group that emerged from the Arab Spring. The
first two goals had easy centers of gravity: take Baghdad, look for a
political leader or take Baghdad and all the other cities, and enforce
the law. But it is much more difficult to attack a group of people
that can easily blend as unprivileged belligerents among other
civilians in a city or that are hiding out in the countryside. For
example, in early 2020, the United States left hundreds of troops in
Iraq to counter Da’esh militants by the Syrian border.317 Many of
the deaths that have occurred in the last year have occurred as
“precision defensive strikes” meant to send a message to Da’esh,
Hezbollah and Iran.318 These precise strikes follow the law of armed
conflict, but since the Da’esh targets are hiding in the city, civilians
have lost their lives in this process. The U.S. has targeted facilities,

314. Hundred
Years’
War,
E NCYCL .
B RITANNICA
(Aug.
20,
2021)
https://www.britannica.com/event/Hundred-Years-War. Part of this struggle included
kings not marching straight to take the throne from the other king, to press the conflict, many
long sieges, and backstabbing by the nobility. Id.
315. NIALL FERGUSON, THE WAR OF THE WORLD: TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONFLICT AND
THE DESCENT OF THE WEST 596–646 (2012); Niall Ferguson, The Third World’s War, YOUTUBE
(Jan. 10, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nku0u45oCtE.
316. The United States, for example, has not declared war since June 5, 1942. See
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RES. SERV., RL31133, DECLARATIONS OF WAR
AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (2014). Nevertheless, the United States has engaged its military
unilaterally in multiple countries, including Lebanon, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Iraq,
Afghanistan, as well as authorized by the United Nations in South Korea, Bosnia, Liberia,
Haiti, and Libya. See id. at 9–10, 12–19, 36.
317. Eric Schmitt, Top General in Middle East Says U.S. Troop Levels Will Drop in Iraq and
Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/world/
middleeast/american-troops-iraq-syria.html.
318. U.S. Hits Iraq Militia Blamed in Defense Contractor’s Death, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/29/strike-iraq-death-militia-090555. Although
the deaths were Hezbollah deaths, the U.S. occasionally tries to set standards of warfare to
factions to limit their aggression.
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such as a factory or an airport in an urban setting in “proportionate
response” to take out these asymmetric militants.319 Since the
militants might hide the fact that they are not civilians by failing
to wear distinctive clothing or insignia (a violation of the law),
the State may not provide a reasonable proportionate response to
an attack.
In considering how armed conflicts will need to adapt in the
future, engaging in armed conflict in an area for a prolonged period
of time will remain incredibly difficult. Moreover, trying to
establish a stable government in an urban environment against the
opponents fighting undetected in a rural/urban landscape, will be
nigh impossible, unless there is a change to international law
respecting unprivileged belligerents.320
B. The Nature of International Law and Emerging Technologies
Armed conflicts have evolved to require new, different types
of emerging technologies: drone strikes,321 cyberattacks,322 space
warfare,323 autonomous functions in weapon systems,324

319. US Launches Air Raids in Iraq After Deadly Rocket Attack, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 13,
2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/retaliatory-strikes-attack-troops-iraq200312220946232.html.
320. DOD LOWM, supra note 23, at § 4.3.1. What is worse is that in the history of
asymmetric warfare, it is more likely for the larger State to lose. See ARREGUIN-TOFT, supra
note 87, at 205.
321. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 306.
322. See, e.g., McGuinness, supra note 307.
323. See, e.g., Koplow, supra note 308.
324. See generally CONG. RES. SERV., IF11150, DEFENSE PRIMER: U.S. POLICY ON LETHAL
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS (2019) (explaining how it is currently legal for the United
States to exercise autonomous weapons, but that the United States currently keeps one
human driver to maintain the human element); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN
ASPECTS (2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1707/4221-002-autonomousweapons-systems-full-report.pdf (discussing the pros and cons of autonomous weapons
systems); Hayley Evans, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems at the First and Second U.N. GGE
Meetings, LAWFARE (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lethal-autonomousweapons-systems-first-and-second-un-gge-meetings (showing that the UN is formally
organizing talks to discuss the problems with lethal autonomous weapons systems).
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hypersonics,325 robotics,326 human enhancement,327 nanotechnology,328
virology tied to a group or an individual’s DNA,329 and artificial
intelligence.330 Part of the issue in not investing more heavily in
PGMs, for some States like the United States, has been the
possibility of investing in newer technologies.331
In the last twenty years of international law, there have been
three treaties recognized by the ICRC on weapons: Convention on
Cluster Munitions, Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons, and an Arms
Trade Treaty.332 Other treaties do exist or are being organized by
other organizations such as the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons or the United Nations Groups of
Governmental Experts.333 Yet there have been many more
incredible changes in technology, such as the Internet, artificial
intelligence, and gene manipulation, and none of these have been
discussed or focused on by the ICRC or other NGOs. Because of the
Lotus principle,334 international law moves very slowly, especially

325. See generally SAYLER – HYPERSONICS, supra note 115.
326. See Evans, supra note 324; see also Zachary Fryer-Biggs, Coming Soon to a Battlefield:
Robots That Can Kill, ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2019/09/killer-robots-and-new-era-machine-driven-warfare/597130/
(demonstrating that there is a mixture of drone technology, AI, and autonomous weapons
systems to create a new type of robotic soldier).
327. See, e.g., Adam Henschke, ‘Supersoldiers’: Ethical Concerns in Human Enhancement
Technologies, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (July 3, 2017), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-andpolicy/2017/07/03/supersoldiers-ethical-concerns-human-enhancement-technologies-2/
(explaining the ethical ramifications of brain stimulation—especially when requiring
someone to kill another—, misusing human volunteers, and the obedience principle
inherent in soldier-commander relations); Patrick Lin, Could Human Enhancement Turn
Soldiers into Weapons that Violate International Law? Yes, ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/could-human-enhancementturn-soldiers-into-weapons-that-violate-international-law-yes/266732/ (analyzing international
law to determine whether human enhancement has any right to be used in the future).
328. See, e.g., Hitoshi Nasu, The Future of Nanotechnology in Warfare, GLOB. J. (July 4,
2013), http://www.theglobaljournal.net/article/view/1132/ (describing how nanobots
can be programmed for a multitude of tasks, including shielding a human being, making
objects appear invisible, stunning rather than killing, attacking the systems network of
another State, etc.).
329. See Eric T. Jensen, Future War, Future Law, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 282, 308–09 (2013)
(explaining how virology and genetics may be linked to a person or group’s DNA).
330. See generally SAYLER – ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 115.
331. See PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS, supra note 110, at 28–30.
332. See Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, supra note 6.
333. See Evans, supra note 324.
334. See discussion supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
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in comparison to massive changes in technology.335 International
law needs to either be created by treaty, by custom, as a generally
acknowledged principle of law, through the most highly qualified
publicists,336 or through NGO soft law. Thus, it may become
difficult for the law to catch up with emerging technologies.
As such, the law concerning urban armed conflict could be
pushed through by treaty or soft law, since it is being created
concurrently with custom. As previously discussed, the universal
use of PGMs is being pushed by certain groups and academics.337
Yet with so many new technologies, it might be foolhardy to invest
in a technology that may be outdated by the time the technology
has been fully developed.338 In considering how best to protect
civilians from armed conflicts with attacking States, it might
behoove a defending State to likewise invest heavily in some form
of new technology.339
State practice, moreover, seems to be following treaty
obligations, limited to only those States. Custom of article 58 is
falling to the wayside. For instance, in the First Gulf War, the
335. For instance, the law of air warfare has taken about one hundred years to develop.
It was an emerging technology one hundred years ago and although there were attempts to
make rules about hot air balloons, see Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of the
Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons or by Other New Analogous Methods
(Hague IV), 32 Stat. 1839 (1899), there have been no surefire treaties in the last hundred years
governing air warfare, Javier Guisández Gómez, The Law of Air Warfare, INT’L REV. RED
CROSS (June 30, 1998), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/
57jpcl.htm. Furthermore, most of the law of air warfare has been interpreted from Hague
Regulations and AP I, such as article 57. Id. At best, the San Remo Manual has been one of
the best manuals at compiling the law of air warfare for conflicts at sea, but even then, it
could still not be considered law. Id.
336. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
There is also soft law but that is even more difficult for it to be expressed, but it includes
naming and shaming from NGOs, other courts, intergovernmental organizations, etc.
337. See discussion supra Section I.A.1.a.
338. The most blatant example that comes to mind is the development of watching prerecorded shows and movies through Betamax, the VCR, Laserdisc, the DVD, and now online
streaming. All of these, and more, have emerged in the last fifty years and it might be
considered imprudent to state that one technology will be the best, when another might come
and outlast the former. Nevertheless, it would be important to state that at some point or
other, one has to metaphorically pull the trigger, in which case a State cannot invest in all the
emerging technologies, because it might need to invest and focus on one to fully understand
its capabilities and uses.
339. If an NGO really pushed for it, article 58 could be upheld in a treaty or some
form of soft law, especially as the ICTY recognized the importance of holding the defending
State to a degree. See Galić, supra note 92, ¶ 37; see also id. at ¶ 58 nn.104, 107 for a more indepth discussion.
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United States continually held that the Iraqis had some part in
protecting their civilian population; but the Iraqi government
attempted to absolve itself of all blame by stating that the United
States was targeting civilians by attacking cities, despite the United
States’ repeated notifications of future bombings via leaflets and
radio broadcasts, providing the Iraqi government ample warning
to protect and evacuate its own citizens.340 But if another Galić-type
court judgment occurs, coupled with newer technologies, then a
misguided court could hold the attacking State responsible by not
using PGMs.341 Yet in this boon of technological progress, attacking
and defending States both have the obligation to pursue technology
that will protect the greatest number of non-combatants possible.
Attacking States should focus on developing technology that will
provide more reliable information as well as highly precise
munitions. The defending States, however, could also invest
heavily in anti-aircraft missiles (for drones), layering systems for
their cities, or even autonomous functions in their weapons systems
to counteract a drone strike, without ever having to bring in the
human element of mistakes.
Thus, to combat possible future accusations of war crimes,
larger States that engage regularly in armed conflict might try to
determine better state practices under article 58.
CONCLUSION
Given the current increase in and expected continuation of
urbanization throughout the world, urban armed conflict is an
increasingly pressing matter, as the ICRC has continually
propounded. AP I articles 57 and 58 are good in upholding the
principles of humanity and military necessity. Nonetheless, state
practice and opinio juris are crucial in further dictating how to
protect civilians by requiring defending States to step up.
Defending States should be held to a higher standard to protect
their own civilian populations during urban armed conflicts by
evacuating non-combatants in order to make their cities less
densely populated, positioning military bases further from
340. See DOD PGW, supra note 84, at xxi–xxii. This also happened in the Second Guld
War. John Esterbrook, U.S. Propaganda Push in Iraq, CBS NEWS (Dec. 18, 2002),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-propaganda-push-in-iraq/.
341. See Galić, supra note 92, at ¶ 40.
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populations, creating better support structures and responses to
known attacks. As defending States pursue this course, attacking
States might attempt to use these measures as a defense, as they did
in Galić, but there are many court systems that would state the
higher standard belongs to the attacking State.
Furthermore, if properly educated in the law of armed conflict
and new technologies, reasonable military leaders from both the
attacking and defending States will ensure that loss, injury, and
damage to civilians and civilian objects do not occur. Finally, new
types of warfare and the ever-changing nature of the law of armed
conflict will change the nature of warfare; but all new technology
should be taken with the intention of protecting urban civilian
populations. The ultimate goal is to protect civilians from the
horrors of war, and hopefully, at the very least, attacks on civilians
and civilian objects will be minimized.
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